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Fundamentally Unfair: 
An Empirical Analysis of Social 
Media Arbitration Clauses  
Thomas H. Koenig† 
Michael L. Rustad‡ 
Abstract 
Our systematic examination of 329 of the world’s largest social 
media providers reveals that 29 percent of these providers require users 
to submit to predispute mandatory arbitration as a condition of using 
their services. Forced consumer arbitration clauses are principally a 
U.S. phenomenon. Forty-two percent of the 188 U.S.-based social media 
providers contain forced arbitration clauses—in sharp contrast to only 
13 percent of the 141 providers headquartered in foreign nations. Forty 
of the social networking websites (SNS) specify the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) as the provider and nineteen specify 
JAMS, the two largest arbitration companies. We compare the fifty-
nine social media terms of use (TOU) against the due process fairness 
tests that have been adopted by these two providers to mitigate the 
inevitable power imbalance in consumer arbitration proceedings. Our 
central finding is that the arbitration clauses of providers that specify 
the AAA and JAMS clearly fail the majority of the provisions of these 
two arbitral providers’ consumer due process fairness tests. Arbitration 
clauses employed by social media have numerous “gotcha” provisions 
such as hard damage caps that place an absolute dollar limit on 
recovery that is significantly below the cost of filing an arbitral claim 
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with either the AAA or JAMS. Our secondary analysis of AAA and 
JAMS arbitration reports establishes that consumer arbitration 
agreements have a deterrent effect, blocking all but a handful of social 
media users from filing claims. In effect, social media providers, 
encouraged by the U.S. Supreme Court’s endorsement of mandatory 
consumer arbitration, have constructed a liability-free zone where social 
media users have rights without remedies if social media providers 
breach their TOU, invade their privacy, or infringe their intellectual 
property rights. These aggressive arbitration clauses are unlikely to be 
enforced in the European Union, or even accepted by the most 
commonly specified arbitral providers, so social networking sites need 
to draft more balanced TOU that pass due process fundamental fairness 
rules.  
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Introduction 
Imagine a profoundly unfair legal world in which businesses redirect 
consumer lawsuits away from state and federal courts into secret 
tribunals, in which a privately hired judge decides cases without 
precedents and with only limited grounds for an appeal. 1  Under 
secretive forced arbitration, the social media service2 determines the 
arbitral provider and selects the rules that govern disputes with 
consumers. Visualize further that social media providers place legally 
binding terms of use (TOU) “agreements” that are seldom, if ever, read. 
Even if they are read, the TOU are composed of unnecessarily complex 
terminology, which is drafted at the comprehension level of a typical 
college graduate. In this dystopian legal world, users are required to 
waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, the right of liberal 
 
1. Under section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may seek revoca-
tion of an arbitration agreement “‘upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract’” including “‘generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” 
AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (citations omitted); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 
173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a court’s review of an 
arbitration is “highly circumscribed,” and “the grounds for revocation 
must relate specifically to the arbitration clause and not just to the 
contract as a whole.”). Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Dealer Solutions, 
L.L.C., 183 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Tex. App. 2005) (stating that judicial 
“[r]eview is so limited that a court may not vacate an arbitration award 
even if it is based upon a mistake of fact or law.”). 
2. Edmond Dantès, Social Networking Service, http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/53943621/Social-Networking-Service (last visited Sept. 19, 2014) (“A 
social networking service is an online service, platform, or site that 
focuses on building and reflecting of social networks or social relations 
among people, e.g., who share interests and/or activities. A social 
network service essentially consists of a representation of each user (often 
a profile), his/her social links, and a variety of additional services. . . . 
Online community services are sometimes considered as a social network 
service, though in a broader sense, social network service usually means 
an individual-centered service whereas online community services are 
group-centered. Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, 
activities, events, and interests within their individual networks.”). 
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discovery, and the right of appeal by agreeing to “take-it-or-leave it” 
terms of use.3  
This is not a law professor’s far-fetched hypothetical. This legal 
dystopia is already here. The users of social networking websites (SNS) 
currently acquiesce to anti–class action waivers, damage caps, 
shortened statutes of limitations, “loser pays” rules, and choice-of-
forum clauses that are buried thousands of words deep in poorly 
indexed boilerplate. A New York University Law School research team 
concluded that only one or two in a thousand consumers that accessed 
a major website actually read its TOU.4 A growing number of social 
media platforms contain predispute mandatory arbitration clauses 
specifying that hearings be conducted in the provider’s home forum, 
which shifts the cost of air travel, hotels, and other expenses onto the 
consumer. These SNS are “rolling contracts” that reserve the right to 
unilaterally change or modify the rules of the game “at any time 
without further notice.”5 Forced arbitration, under these imbalanced 
TOU, creates a liability-free zone for an increasing number of social 
media providers.  
Snapchat, an application that “lets users exchange photos, videos 
or text messages that are claimed to vanish within 10 seconds after they 
 
3. “U.S.-style terms of use (‘TOU’) are ‘take it or leave it’ waivers, 
masquerading in the clothing of contract and divesting consumers of 
important procedural and substantive rights.” Michael L. Rustad & 
Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of Use for 
a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1085, 1085 (2012). 
4. Hearing on Aggressive Sales Tactics on the Internet and Their Impact on 
American Consumers Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Trans., 
111th Cong. 24 (2009) (statement of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler) (testifying 
that her research is drawn from a statistical analysis of the online browsing 
behavior of more than 45,000 households accessing sixty-six websites). 
5. Approximately 67 percent (66.6%) of the 329 social media TOU structured 
their contract as a rolling contract, where the provider reserves the right to 
revise, add, or delete a term, at a later time, at its discretion. For the 59 
TOU reported in this article, 73% (N=43) incorporated a rolling contract 
provision in their TOU. See, e.g., Klout, Terms of Use, 
https://klout.com/corp/terms (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (“We reserve the 
right, at our sole discretion, to change or modify portions of these Terms of 
Service at any time without further notice. You should periodically visit 
this page to review the current Terms of Service so you are aware of any 
revision to which you are bound. If we do this, we will post the changes to 
these Terms of Service on this page and will indicate at the top of this page 
the date these terms were last revised. Your continued use of the Services 
after any such changes constitutes your acceptance of the new Terms of 
Service. If you do not agree to abide by these or any future Terms of Service, 
do not use or access (or continue to use or access) the Services. It is your 
responsibility to regularly check the Site to determine if there have been 
changes to these Terms of Service and to review such changes.”). 
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have been viewed,”6 provides a good illustration of the impact of one-
sided TOU. Snapchat’s TOU forecloses the rights of millions of its 
registrants whose privacy was invaded by a cyberattack that was 
enabled by the website’s negligent security. 7  On January 1, 2014, 
hackers “published 4.6 million Snapchat usernames and redacted phone 
numbers on a website.”8 Shortly after this cyberattack, Snapchat issued 
an apology to its customers and an update that decoupled their users’ 
usernames from their phone numbers.9 The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) entered into a settlement with Snapchat because of its 
substandard security and inadequate privacy protection that required 
the provider to “implement a comprehensive privacy program that will 
be monitored by an independent privacy professional for the next 20 
years.”10 Snapchat agreed to stop “falsely claiming that messages are 
truly disappearing” and to cease and desist making other 
misrepresentations.11  
 
6. Richard Adhikari, Security Firm Spills the Beans on Snapchat 
Vulnerabilities, Technewsworld (Dec. 28, 2013, 5:00 AM), http:// 
www.technewsworld.com/story/79705.html. 
7. Id. (“One of these was a flaw in the ‘Find friends’ function that let hackers 
easily create a database of the usernames and phone numbers of Snapchat 
app users. Another was a denial of service exploit.”). 
8. Paddy Wood, Snapchat to Boost Security After Breach, The Australian 
(Jan. 3, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-
news/snapchat-to-boost-security-after-breach/story-fn3dxiwe-1226794336966. 
9. Find Friends Improvements, Snapchat (Jan. 9, 2014), http://blog. 
snapchat.com/post/72768002320/find-friends-improvements (explaining 
that Snapchat “released a Snapchat update for Android and iOS that 
improves Find Friends functionality and allows Snapchatters to opt-out 
of linking their phone number with their username”). 
10. Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages 
Were False, Fed. Trade Comm’n (May 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-
promises-disappearing-messages-were (“Snapchat, the developer of a 
popular mobile messaging app, has agreed to settle Federal Trade 
Commission charges that it deceived consumers with promises about the 
disappearing nature of messages sent through the service. The FTC case 
also alleged that the company deceived consumers over the amount of 
personal data it collected and the security measures taken to protect that 
data from misuse and unauthorized disclosure. In fact, the case alleges, 
Snapchat’s failure to secure its Find Friends feature resulted in a security 
breach that enabled attackers to compile a database of 4.6 million 
Snapchat usernames and phone numbers.”). 
11. Kia Kokalitcheva, Snapchat Pays Up Over Privacy Allegations, Gets 
Slapped With 20-year Probation, VentureBeat (May 8, 2014, 12:16 
PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/05/08/snapchat-pays-up-over-privac 
y-allegations-gets-slapped-with-20-year-probation/ (charging Snapchat 
with negligent security in its Find Friends Features because “Snapchat 
failed to verify users’ phone numbers during registration, many users, 
while thinking they were messaging friends, have unknowingly sent 
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Snapchat’s millions of users have no realistic remedy to compensate 
them for the fraudulent misrepresentations, the consequences of 
negligent security, or any other cause of action because the website’s 
TOU eliminate every conceivable category of damages, disclaim all 
warranties, and require the user to hold the provider harmless. 
Snapchat’s limitation of liability clause states that if the social media 
site “is found liable to you for any damage or loss which arises out of 
or is in any way connected with your use of the Services or any content, 
Snapchat’s liability shall in no event exceed $1.00.”12 Snapchat’s TOU 
impose mandatory arbitration, requiring consumers to waive their right 
to litigate and appear before an arbitrator in Los Angeles County, no 
matter where they reside.13 The basic filing fee with JAMS—Snapchat’s 
designated arbitral provider—in a consumer case is 250 times the total 
possible recovery of one dollar, which is the provider’s hard cap on 
recovery.14 Snapchat users may not initiate or join class actions against 
the provider, even though the potential recovery is a minuscule fraction 
of the cost of filing a consumer arbitration and of journeying to Los 
Angeles to engage in the arbitral hearing. 15  The Snapchat TOU 
represent that “[o]ther than class procedures and remedies discussed 
below, the arbitrator has the authority to grant any remedy that would 
 
messages to strangers who had registered with phone numbers that did 
not belong to them” and also failed to secure its site which “led to a recent 
security breach, and attackers were able to gather a database of 4.6 
million usernames and phones”). 
12. Terms of Use, Snapchat, https://www.snapchat.com/terms/ (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Snapchat]. 
13. Id. (“You and Snapchat agree to arbitrate any dispute arising from these 
Terms or your use of the Services, except that you and Snapchat are not 
required to arbitrate any dispute in which either party seeks equitable and 
other relief for the alleged unlawful use of copyrights, trademarks, trade 
names, logos, trade secrets, or patents. ARBITRATION PREVENTS YOU 
FROM SUING IN COURT OR FROM HAVING A JURY TRIAL. You 
and Snapchat agree (a) that any arbitration will occur in Los Angeles 
County, California; (b) that arbitration will be conducted confidentially by 
a single arbitrator in accordance with the rules of JAMS; and (c) that the 
state or federal courts of Los Angeles County, California have exclusive 
jurisdiction over any appeals of an arbitration award and over any suit, if 
any, between the parties not subject to arbitration. Other than class 
procedures and remedies discussed below, the arbitrator has the authority 
to grant any remedy that would otherwise be available in court. 
WHETHER THE DISPUTE IS HEARD IN ARBITRATION OR IN 
COURT, YOU AND SNAPCHAT WILL NOT COMMENCE AGAINST 
THE OTHER A CLASS ACTION, CLASS ARBITRATION OR 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION OR PROCEEDING.”). 
14. Consumer Arbitration Minimum Standards, JAMS, http://www.jams 
adr.com/consumer-arbitration/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
15. Snapchat, supra note 12. 
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otherwise be available in court.”16 Contrary to its assertion about the 
arbitrator’s power to order equivalent remedies, Snapchat uses contract 
law to eliminate every category of damages and, in any event, does not 
permit the arbiter to award more than one dollar.17 
This Article empirically explores whether Snapchat’s TOU are 
broadly representative of fine print contracts in the social media 
industry.18 The policy debate over binding mandatory arbitration is 
being waged in a data vacuum, primarily through exchanges of com-
peting anecdotes and unsupported generalities about fairness, efficiency 
and lower costs. 19  Our findings demonstrate conclusively that 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (“Except where prohibited by law, in no event will Snapchat or the 
Snapchat Parties be liable for any indirect, special, punitive, incidental, 
exemplary or consequential damages that result from (a) the use of, or 
inability to use, the Services; (b) the provision of the Services or any 
materials available therein; or (c) the conduct of other users of the 
Services, even if Snapchat has been advised of the possibility of such 
damages . . . . Snapchat’s liability shall in no event exceed $1.00.”). 
18. Facebook claims more than 1.39 billion users. Facebook, https://www. 
facebook.com/Gisttvmedia/posts/1068312803195877 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2015). Facebook is followed by Twitter with 560 million, Google+ with 400 
million, LinkedIn with 240 million, and Pinterest with 70 million. Shea 
Bennett, Pinterest, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Google+, LinkedIn—
Social Media Stats 2014, Mediabistro (Jan. 20, 2014, 9:00 AM) 
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-stats-2014_b54243. 
19. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s 
Better Than It Looks, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 783, 810 (2008) (“The 
vast majority of ordinary, lower- and middle-income employees 
(essentially, those making less than $60,000 a year) cannot get access to 
the courts to vindicate their contractual and statutory rights. . . . Their 
only practical hope is the generally cheaper, faster, and more informal 
process of arbitration.”); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and 
Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 813, 
826 (2008) (“The majority (if not the substantial majority) of survey 
respondents (51%–89%) stated that arbitration was ‘less expensive’ or 
‘more cost effective’ than litigation.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The 
Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 233, 236 
(2008) (“It is not a hyperbole to state that civil justice or adjudication in 
the United States . . . is achieved primarily through arbitration.”); cf. 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1631, 1633–34 (2005) (“At the same time, mandatory arbitration 
has its advocates. While few, if any, would defend the most unfair 
arbitration clauses in which companies impose nonneutral arbitrators or 
greatly limit possible recoveries, some contend that fair binding 
arbitration is better for claimants than the alternative of litigation. They 
urge that when companies include arbitration in form contracts, they help 
consumers and employees by providing them with a forum that is cheaper, 
quicker, and more accessible than litigation. Such defenders also urge that 
to the extent companies reduce their own dispute resolution costs, market 
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imbalanced forced arbitration TOU mandates are not rogue outliers but 
are typical of the one-sided boilerplate “agreements” imposed on 
consumers by the social media industry.  
To date, there has been little empirical evidence on the contracting 
practices of online providers. 20  The Consumer Protection Financial 
Bureau (CPFB), which has published preliminary results for a study of 
consumer arbitration mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, is a notable 
exception.21 The Director of the CPFB notes that the supporters of 
consumer arbitration describe it as a “better alternative” to the court 
system—“more convenient, more efficient, and a lower-cost way of 
resolving disputes,”22 but their preliminary results suggest the existence 
of anti-consumer imbalances. Systematic data are needed to determine 
whether consumer arbitration clauses should be prohibited or reformed 
by enacting mandatory consumer protection clauses. 
This Article transcends the heated rhetoric over whether forced 
arbitration limits justice to provide an empirical assessment of the 
content and effects of social media arbitration clauses, where the AAA 
and JAMS were chosen by social media as exclusive arbitral providers.23 
 
forces will ensure that they pass on such savings to their workers in the 
form of higher wages, and to their customers in the form of lower prices.”). 
20. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 19; Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, 
Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 
Penn St. L. Rev. 1051, 1052–53 (2009) (using data to conclude that “the 
consumer arbitration process provides a more pro-consumer environment 
for claims adjudication than does the traditional court system.”). 
21. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information 
Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of 
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 2012) 
(“Section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010 (the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’) requires the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the ‘Bureau’) to ‘conduct a 
study of, and . . . provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of 
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between 
covered persons and consumers in connection with the offering or 
providing of consumer financial products or services’ (the “Study”).”); 12 
U.S.C. § 5518 (2012) (provision of Dodd-Frank requiring a study and 
report to Congress regarding consumer agreements with arbitration 
clauses). See also Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of Director 
Richard Cordray at the Field Hearing on Arbitration, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-director-richard-
cordray-at-the-field-hearing-on-arbitration/ (outlining the responsibilities 
of the CFPB under the Dodd-Frank Act and procedures for determining 
if arbitration agreements should stand).  
22. Cordray, supra note 21. 
23. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 289, 292 (2012) (“The leading 
arbitration providers, the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) and 
JAMS (formerly the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service), have 
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No prior study has conducted a content analysis of social media 
arbitration clauses to determine whether they conform to AAA and 
JAMS consumer due process protocols and the degree to which 
providers suppress arbitral claims by harsh terms.24 The only previous 
study of consumer arbitration concluded that arbitration clauses largely 
complied with due process.25 In sharp contrast, the consumer arbitra-
tion clauses we studied are so sharply skewed in favor of the provider 
that they clearly violate the rules of due process “fundamental fairness” 
required by the two major providers, AAA and JAMS.26  
I. Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses 
Employed by Social Media 
The popular wisdom is that consumers do “reasonably well” in 
arbitration, when administered by the AAA, JAMS, and other sound 
arbitral providers.27 Corporations benefit as well because “[r]elative to 
 
both promulgated due process protocols governing consumer and 
employment arbitrations.”). 
24. There is a growing body of studies of consumer arbitration in other 
contexts. See generally, Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, 
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 
J. Empirical Legal Stud. 536 (2012) (presenting an empirical study 
on consumer arbitration in the context of credit card agreements). 
25. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 23, at 341 (“In the case file sample of 
AAA consumer arbitrations, the majority of consumer arbitration clauses 
(229 of 299, or 76.6%) fully complied with the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol as applied by the AAA. We found no statistically significant 
difference in how frequently clauses violated the Protocol between cases 
seeking $75,000 or less (which were subject to AAA protocol compliance 
review) and cases seeking over $75,000 (which were not).”). 
26. See id. at 305 (“The protocols do not make clear whether ‘fundamental 
fairness’ is an independent requirement that must be satisfied or whether 
complying with the other requirements of the protocols constitutes 
fundamental fairness. The Commentary to the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol suggests the latter, explaining that the other principles in the 
Protocol ‘identify specific minimum due process standards which embody 
the concept of fundamental fairness.’”).  
27. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through 
Party Choice, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1329, 1366 (2012) (“[W]hile the evidence is 
mixed, there are empirical studies that show consumers fare reasonably well 
in some important types of consumer arbitration. Reputable organizations 
like the American Arbitration Association (AAA) have incentives to provide 
reasonably fair arbitration procedures in order to preserve a reputation for 
evenhandedness.”); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The 
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 457, 472 (2011) (“[I]n the vast majority of 
consumer arbitrations, consumers pay fewer fees than they would in court, 
obtain results faster than they would in court, and win greater relief than 
they would likely win in court.”). But cf. Public Citizen, The Arbitration 
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litigation, arbitration provides opportunities for a business to save on 
its dispute-resolution costs”28 and because they avoid bad publicity by 
requiring their customers to submit to non-public alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) procedures.29 The opponents of mandatory predis-
pute consumer arbitration, in rebuttal, “argue that arbitration clauses 
deprive consumers of certain legal protections available in court, and 
may serve to quash a dispute rather than provide an alternative way 
to resolve it.” 30  Forced arbitration, critics contend, disadvantages 
consumers by creating a repeat player bias, capping award size, 
allowing evidence to be concealed, employing clandestine proceedings, 
suppressing claims and prohibiting an appellate court review to reverse 
or modify an arbitrator’s erroneous decision.31 This empirical study 
provides the first content analysis of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
SNS, drawing upon the largest sample of social media providers ever 
assembled. 
A. Sample of Social Media Sites 
SNS may be broadly defined as platforms that enable members to 
create, manage, and share interests online. These social media websites 
enable interactivity among users such as the construction of profiles or 
instant messaging capabilities in order to share interests such as family, 
dating, friendship, or hobbies. The number and size of SNS have 
exploded over the past decade. Nearly two-thirds of SNS containing 
consumer arbitration clauses were founded after 2007.  
 
Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (finding 
that businesses win 94% of National Arbitration Forum arbitrations); Robert 
Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins), Bus. Wk. 
(June 4, 2008) (reporting that consumers win only .2% of the time), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-06-04/banks-vs-dot-consumers-
guess-who-wins. 
28. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. Resol. 89, 89 (2001). 
29. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 876, 894–95 (2008) (reporting that “[o]ver three-
quarters of the studied companies’ consumer agreements provided for 
mandatory arbitration of disputes. Yet less than 10% of their negotiated 
nonconsumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses” and 
that arbitration is “a way to save money by avoiding aggregate dispute 
resolution.”); see generally Alliance for Justice, Arbitration Activism: 
How the Corporate Court Helps Business Evade Our Civil Justice 
System (2011), available at www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
12/Arbitration-Activism-Report-12162013.pdf (discussing how the Supreme 
Court’s decisions regarding mandatory arbitration protect big business and 
its interests at the expense of consumers). 
30. Cordray, supra note 21. 
31. Alliance for Justice, supra note 29, at 5. 
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We identified 329 of the largest SNS worldwide and then chose the 
29 percent (N=94) whose TOU contained predispute arbitration clauses 
for detailed analysis. The sample of the world’s most prominent SNS 
was compiled using multiple sources that included Wikipedia’s list of 
Social Network Sites, Alexa’s Top Websites, a compilation of top social 
media sites, a list of publicly traded SNS, numerous articles reporting 
about the leading social media websites worldwide, and information 
provided by JD and LLM students from countries in Asia, Europe, and 
Latin America. 
Social media sites are rarely free. At a minimum, social networks 
commodify the personal data and user-generated content of their users. 
If the providers do not directly charge for subscriptions or premium 
features, or sell virtual or real goods, mobile applications, or games, the 
providers sell personal information supplied by users, which means that 
there is a quid pro quo in these mass-market licenses. Fifty-six percent 
of the SNS sample mandating arbitration employed a revenue model 
based upon users paying for either a basic subscription or for premium 
features (N=29).  
Three of the fifty-nine SNS raised revenue by selling virtual or 
tangible property. Greater than one in three SNS also relied upon 
advertising paid by third parties (N=20, 34%). Meetup, a meetings 
social network, for example, charges its users twelve to twenty dollars 
per meeting while also deriving revenues from advertising, the sale of 
virtual currency, and subscriptions. The dating sites conditioned access 
on paying subscriptions.  
B. Sample of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses  
Forty of the ninety-four social media providers that included 
arbitration clauses chose the AAA as the provider (42.5%). Twenty-
five social media providers specified arbitration but did not choose an 
arbitral provider (26.6%). Nineteen of the ninety-four clauses specified 
JAMS (20%). Three providers chose the ADR Institute of Canada. 
Other arbitral providers included the United States Arbitration & 
Mediation (USAM), Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC), China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission, Beijing Arbitration Commission, South African 
Arbitration Commission, and the European Arbitration Association. 
Only eighteen of the 141 foreign SNS selected mandatory 
arbitration—13 percent versus 42 percent of the U.S. providers. 
Seventy-six of the ninety-four SNS choosing forced arbitration were 
founded in the United States, followed by six headquartered in Canada 
and five in China. Two SNS originating in India chose mandatory 
arbitration as did single sites in Finland, Hong Kong, South Africa, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Some non-U.S. SNS selected 
foreign arbitration providers such as SIAC (Hong Kong), the China 
International Arbitration Association, the European Arbitration 
Association, and the Beijing Arbitration Commission. None of these 
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providers gave the social media registrant a link or other source of 
information as to basic procedural issues such as what rules would apply 
or the financial costs of arbitration.  
Arbitration clauses selected by Chinese SNS tended to be cryptic 
and provided almost no information on arbitral rules and procedures. 
Douban’s arbitration clause is fairly typical: 
The use of this protocol and the relationship between you and 
Douban are governed by the laws of People’s Republic of 
China. Any disputes arising out of or relating to the service, 
the protocol or other relevant matters shall first be resolved 
through friendly consultations. In case that no consensus is 
reached, it should be submitted to the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for arbitration, 
the arbitral award is final, binding on both parties.32 
Jiayuan, China’s equivalent to Match.com, includes an arbitration 
clause in its user agreement that states the following: 
The implementation, interpretation and dispute resolution 
regarding the registration provisions are governed by the 
current laws of the People’s Republic of China. Any disputes 
arising out of the provisions shall be submitted to the Beijing 
Arbitration Commission for arbitration. The arbitral award is 
final. In the case that some of the registration provisions are 
invalid because of a conflict with the current laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, the validity of other provisions 
shall not be affected.33 
Few U.S. users would be at ease arbitrating with such a provider given 
that the site does not provide a link to where the consumer can learn 
more about how Chinese arbitration works. Chinese users of Snapchat 
may feel equally as hesitant to appear in an arbitration hearing held 
under unfamiliar rules in Los Angeles County. The cost of air travel 
alone would far exceed what is at stake. Many social media users agree 
to arbitration before the social media provider determines which 
providers’ rules of arbitration apply. Greater than one in four social 
media sites out of the ninety-four required users to acquiesce to 
arbitration without disclosing the name of the arbitral provider (27%, 
N=25).  
 Six social media sites selected the ADR Institute of Canada (6%). 
Here again, social media clauses did not provide users with basic 
information on the rules of arbitration, and only a few provided a link 
 
32. Use Agreement, Douban, http://www.douban.com/about/agreement 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
33. Use Agreement, Jiayuan, http://reg.jiayuan.com/clause.php (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015). 
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where users could obtain further information about the fundamental 
rules for arbitration. 34  Companies’ strategic use of unbalanced 
arbitration terms are less likely to be employed in business-to-business 
disputes than when dealing with consumers.35  
C. AAA & JAMS Consumer Arbitration Clauses 
This analysis focuses on social media arbitration clauses where 
social media providers chose either AAA or JAMS rules for arbitration. 
Together, these two arbitral providers comprise 63 percent of the 
arbitration sample (59 of 94). Nearly 43 percent of the social media 
providers selecting compulsory arbitration in order to bypass the court 
system chose the AAA as the arbitral provider (N=40), followed by 20 
percent that selected JAMS (N=19). Fifty-seven out of the fifty-nine 
SNS choosing either the AAA or JAMS as the arbitral provider were 
headquartered in the United States while the other two were Canadian 
social media. Seventeen of the fifty-nine SNS specifying either the AAA 
or JAMS were paid dating sites. Multimedia sharing sites and shared 
interest websites tied as the second largest groups, each accounting for 
one in five of the sites (N=12). Messages/blogs accounted for 14 percent 
of the sample (N=6), followed by 7 percent classified as social connect-
ions websites (N=4). 
D. Applying Commercial Arbitration Rules 
for Disputes with Consumers 
 The clearest example of due process fundamental unfairness was 
the SNS that stated or implied that these social media disputes should 
be decided under commercial arbitration rules. Commercial rules place 
social media users at a significant disadvantage. For example, the 
AAA’s and JAMS’s supplementary consumer rules require companies 
to heavily subsidize the cost of arbitration, in contrast to the 
commercial rules where the user and business share costs equally. 
Providing subsidies to consumers counterbalances the massive advant-
ages held by a corporation when confronting an individual.  
The AAA recognizes a dual-track system for arbitration depending 
upon whether it is business-to-business, where the Commercial Dispute 
 
34. The Federal Arbitration Act’s substantive provision only requires that 
the parties agree to arbitration. Section 2 provides that “[a] written 
provision in any . . . contract . . . to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
35. Eisenberg et al., supra note 29, at 895 (stating that “corporations’ 
selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each 
other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be 
based more on strategic advantage” in defending against consumer 
claims). 
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Resolution Procedures apply, or business-to-consumer, where Supple-
mentary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes are followed.36 The 
AAA rules state that “[i]f there is a difference between the Commercial 
Dispute Resolution Procedures and the Supplementary Procedures, the 
Supplementary Procedures will be used.” 37  Under the AAA’s 
commercial arbitration rules, “the minimum fees for any case having 
three or more arbitrators are $1,000 for the Initial Filing Fee; $2,125 
for the Proceed Fee; and $1,250 for the Final Fee.”38 The commercial 
fees “do not cover the cost of hearing rooms, which are available on a 
rental basis” and shared by the parties.39 The AAA charges an annual 
abeyance fee of $300 for cases inactive for a year.40 JAMS also states 
that it will not administer consumer arbitration unless its minimum 
standards of fairness are adopted.41 Table One (below) compares the 
AAA and JAMS consumer arbitration rules: 
  
 
36. Thomas L. Gravelle & Mary A. Bedikian, 8B Mich. Pl. & Pr., 
Appendix 62C.XI:N (2d ed. 2013). 
37. Id. 
38. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Offers Two Fee Schedules, 
Am. Arb. Ass’n 2, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF? 
doc=ADRSTG_012009 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
39. Id. 
40. Cost of Arbitration (Including AAA Administrative Fees), Am. Arb. 
Ass’n 2, [hereinafter Costs of Arbitration] https://www.adr.org/cs/ 
idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTAGE2020622&Revi
sionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
41. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses 
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS 2 (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules 
/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-2009.pdf. 
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Table One: AAA and JAMS Consumer Arbitration Rules 
 
Cost AAA JAMS
Filing Fees $20042 $25043
What Consumer 
Pays Toward 
Arbitrator’s 
Compensation
Nothing, business pays for 
arbitrator44 
Nothing, 
business pays 
for arbitrator45 
Cost of 
Arbitrator 
“Arbitrators serving on a 
case with an in-person or 
telephonic hearing will 
receive compensation at a 
rate of $1500 per day.”46 For 
non-appearance or desk 
arbitration, arbitrators are 
paid $750 per hearing day.47
Silent 
Who Pays 
Arbitral Room 
Rentals? 
Consumer pays nothing, 
business pays entire sum48 
Consumer pays 
nothing, 
business pays 
entire sum49
Who Pays 
Consumers’ 
Lodging, Travel, 
and Attorneys’ 
Fees? 
Consumer bears these costs Consumer bears 
these costs 
 
A few U.S. social media providers have pushed the envelope in 
attempting to apply commercial arbitration rules to disputes with their 
 
42. Consumer-Related Disputes: Supplementary Procedures, Am. Arb. Ass’n 
12, [hereinafter Consumer-Related Disputes], https://www.adr.org 
/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer;jsessionid=Gw08TNTYN5sdv96qTpKwN7
FgMX51G5kQJpmx2lkptGyG8mv3Tmd0!-429404097?_afrLoop=738 
055142526081&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_af
rWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D738055142526081%26_afrWindow
Mode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D4um8szixl_4 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) 
(fee listed in table was effective as of March 1, 2013). 
43. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2 (capping consumer’s responsibility for arbitra-
tor fees at $250). 
44. Consumer-Related Disputes, supra note 42, at 14.  
45. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
46. Cost of Arbitration, supra note 40, at 1. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 2.  
49. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
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consumers in their arbitration clauses. Gaia Online, for example, 
imposes the AAA’s commercial arbitration rules rather than the 
provider’s supplementary consumer rules.50  “Focus, a photo-sharing 
site, required arbitrations to be conducted in San Francisco under the 
AAA’s commercial law rules.”51 MOG, a music-themed social network, 
imposes commercial arbitration rules that specify three arbitrators.52 It 
appears hard to justify requiring what is clearly a consumer dispute 
under commercial arbitration rules. The AAA or JAMS probably would 
refuse to apply their respective commercial rules to what is clearly a 
consumer transaction. This is largely a hypothetical question, as 
consumers rarely file arbitration proceedings against social media 
providers. The providers’ inclusion of commercial arbitration rules, 
however, is likely to have a chilling impact on users filing claims by 
creating the possibly false impression that the consumer is liable for 
paying 50 percent of the considerable cost of hiring an arbitrator, 
renting a hearing room, and other arbitration expenses.53 
E. The Presentation of Arbitral Clauses 
Arbitration is a matter of contract law, so, at a minimum, the TOU 
must reveal that the consumer entered into an agreement to arbitrate 
disputes.54 A case can be made that these terms are too inconspicuous 
 
50. Terms of Service, Gaia Online, http://www.gaiaonline.com/info/legal/tos 
(last updated Feb. 7, 2015) (“In the event of a dispute involving the 
interpretation or application of these Terms, or based upon, relating to or 
arising out of these Terms or Gaia Online, you consent that such dispute shall 
be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a single arbitrator in the 
State of California, County of Santa Clara in accordance with Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).”).  
51. Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. 
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 643, 666 (2012). 
52. Terms of Use & EULA, MOG, https://mog.com/#!terms (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015) (“The arbitration shall be conducted under the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) before 
a panel of three arbitrators and conducted in the State of California.”). 
53. The AAA has two fee schedules, the standard fee schedule and the flexible 
fee schedule. Initial filing fees under the standard schedule range from 
$775 to $12,800 depending upon the dollar amount claimed. Under the 
flexible schedule, the fees range from $400 to $4,500. “The fees described 
above do not cover the cost of hearing rooms, which are available on a 
rental basis.” Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 38. 
54. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
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and too uninformative to constitute a binding agreement. Forty-six 
percent of the clauses were inconspicuously presented, as evaluated by 
applying the tests for conspicuousness followed by the Uniform 
Commercial Code (N=27).55 SNS place arbitration clauses obscurely, 
toward the end of a long boilerplate document, sometimes under a 
category misleadingly labeled “Miscellaneous” or “Dispute Resolution.” 
Registrants would have to read an average of 4,967 words before 
encountering an arbitration clause in the typical social networking TOU 
(median=5,100 words). Social media providers included an index in 
only fourteen of the fifty-nine TOU, making it difficult to locate 
arbitration clauses buried deep in the interior of the boilerplate. Only 
two of the fifty-nine arbitration clauses provided users with a box giving 
the user clear notice that the TOU required users to submit to 
arbitration.  
Social media arbitration clauses generally were very brief, providing 
almost no basic information about the rules under which arbitration 
would be conducted. The mean social media arbitration clause was only 
372 words in length. Only eighteen of the fifty-nine arbitration clauses 
provided any explanation of arbitration or its consequences (N=31%). 
Only fourteen of the fifty-nine social media providers (24%) provided 
the customer with a link to where they could get additional information 
about the rules of arbitration. Only eight of the fifty-nine social media 
providers described how users could initiate arbitration (14%). Roughly 
one in three social media TOU had either a notice or hyperlinked index 
with arbitration as an entry (N=20, 34%).  
CafeMom’s brief arbitral clause is illustrative of providers giving 
consumers no information about how the ADR method works or its 
implications. The arbitration clause, situated in an obscure 
“Miscellaneous” section near the end of the TOU, gives consumers only 
the most minimal information about the arbitration process: 
You agree that, with the exception of injunctive relief sought 
by CafeMom for any violation of CafeMom’s proprietary or 
other rights, any and all disputes relating to these TOS, your 
 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
55. See Unif. Com. Code § 1-201 (amended 2010), 1 U.L.A. 183–84 (2012) 
(explaining that “conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, 
displayed, or presented that “a reasonable person against whom it is to 
operate ought to have noticed it,” including (A) a heading in capitals equal 
to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, 
or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) language 
in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, 
or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same 
size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other 
marks that call attention to the language; however, “whether a term or 
clause is ‘conspicuous’ or not is for decision by the court”). 
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use of the Site or the Services shall be resolved by arbitration 
in accordance with the then-current rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (the “AAA”) before an independent 
arbitrator designated by the AAA. The location of arbitration 
shall be New York, New York, USA.56 
CafeMom does not advise consumers that special consumer rules apply 
but only specifies that the “then-current rules of the American 
Arbitration Association” will be utilized.57  
F. Do Arbitral Clauses Satisfy Consumer Due Process Principles?  
Consumers who enter into clickwrap or browsewrap TOU waive 
their right to a jury trial, discovery, and appeal, without reasonable 
notice that they are waiving these important rights.58 Principle 11 of 
the Consumer Due Process Protocol requires that SNS give consumers:  
a. clear and adequate notice of the arbitration provision and 
its consequences, including a statement of its mandatory or 
optional character;  
b. reasonable access to information regarding the arbitration 
process, including basic distinctions between arbitration and 
court proceedings, related costs, and advice as to where they 
 
56. Terms of Service, CafeMom, http://www.cafemom.com/about/tos.php 
(last updated Feb. 7, 2015). 
57. Id. 
58. Many social media, including Pheed, a music social media platform, 
premise contract formation on browsing a website: “PLEASE READ 
CAREFULLY THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT. BY ACCESSING, 
BROWSING, AND/OR OTHERWISE USING THE SERVICE, YOU 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD, AND 
AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT 
AGREE TO THESE TERMS, THEN PLEASE DO NOT USE THE 
SERVICE.” Terms of Use, Pheed, https://www.pheed.com/terms-of-use 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2014); see also, Terms and Conditions, ReverbNation, 
http://www.reverbnation.com/main/terms_and_conditions#top (last 
updated Feb. 7, 2014) (“BY ACCESSING AND USING THE SITE AND 
THE SERVICES, YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE TO BE 
BOUND BY THESE GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, OUR 
COPYRIGHT POLICY, OUR PRIVACY POLICY, OUR 
TRADEMARK POLICY AND OUR SPECIFIC TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN SERVICES YOU MAY 
ELECT TO USE (ALL OF WHICH ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN 
AND COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS THE ‘TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS’, WHICH SET FORTH THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
PERTAINING TO YOUR USE OF THE SITE AND SERVICES, AND 
SUPERSEDE ALL PRIOR VERSIONS OF THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS). . . . IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS, DO NOT USE THE SITE OR SERVICES.”). 
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may obtain more complete information regarding arbitration 
procedures and arbitrator rosters;  
c. notice of the option to make use of applicable small claims 
court procedures as an alternative to binding arbitration in 
appropriate cases; and,  
d. a clear statement of the means by which the Consumer may 
exercise the option (if any) to submit disputes to arbitration 
or to court process.59 
Our empirical data permit us to assess whether SNS are satisfying 
several of the AAA and JAMS due process principles.60 While our data 
do not allow us to directly measure the “fundamental fairness” of AAA 
and JAMS arbitral clauses employed by SNS, this section presents 
several unobtrusive tests by which to assess fairness.61 An unobtrusive 
test is an indirect measure “without introducing any formal 
measurement procedure.”62 
1. AAA Principle 1: Fundamentally Fair Process  
The AAA’s first due process principle is that “[a]ll parties are 
entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process,” which is a problematic 
standard to measure objectively.63 Fundamental fairness, after all, is a 
subjective concept that may be interpreted differently by consumers 
and providers. Since fairness is not mechanically ascertainable, we must 
utilize other measures. Table Two (below) presents a number of 
 
59. Consumer Due Process Protocol, Am. Arb. Ass’n 3 (Apr. 17, 1998) 
[hereinafter Consumer Due Process], https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc 
=ADRSTG_005014. 
60. Because these protocols are functionally equivalent in important respects, our 
analysis will compare social media arbitration clauses to the principles of the 
combined protocol. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 23, at 306 (“The 
protocols typically require (1) independent and impartial arbitrators; (2) 
reasonable arbitration costs; (3) a reasonably convenient hearing location; (4) 
reasonable time limits for the proceeding; (5) the right to representation; (6) 
adequate discovery; and (7) a fair hearing. Not all of the provisions of the 
protocols on these topics are identical, but they are broadly consistent.”). 
61. See id. at 312 (“Principle 1. Fundamentally Fair Process: As discussed 
above, the text of the Protocol is not clear whether Principle 1 states a 
separate requirement of fundamental fairness or whether it merely 
indicates that the remaining principles of the Protocol protect funda-
mental fairness. Nonetheless, in reviewing clauses, the AAA is to consider 
whether the procedures set out in the arbitration clause are unduly one-
sided—whether they unduly favor the business in ways not addressed in 
other principles of the Protocol.”). 
62. William M.K. Trochim, Unobtrusive Measures, Res. Methods Knowl-
edge Base, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/unobtrus.php 
(last updated Oct. 20, 2006). 
63. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59, at 1. 
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unobtrusive measures regarding whether the substance of the 
arbitration clauses, and their presentation, are fundamentally fair. 
Table Two: Unobtrusive Measures of Fundamental Fairness 
Unobtrusive 
Measure of 
Fundamental 
Fairness (N=59)
Yes, specified in 
TOU 
Not specified in 
TOU 
Social media provider 
mentioned consumer 
arbitration rules
41% (N=24) 59% (N=35). 
Social media provider 
gave link where user 
could get further info 
about arbitration
14% (N=8) 86% (N=51) 
Social media provider 
explained what 
arbitration involves
31% (N=18) 70% (N=41) 
Social media provider 
disclosed that by 
acceding to arbitration, 
user waived right to 
jury trial or court 
disposition 
48% (N=28) 53% (N=31) 
Social media provider 
disclosed any right of 
discovery 
14% (N=8) 86% (N=51) 
Social media provider 
disclosed that user’s 
right to appeal was 
narrowed by acceding 
to arbitration
17% (N=10) 83% (N=49) 
 
Table Two demonstrates that a substantial majority of SNS require 
users to accede to predispute mandatory arbitration without the 
minimum information they need to weigh advantages versus 
disadvantages. Because only a minority of the fifty-nine social media 
providers choosing the AAA or JAMS provided as much as a definition 
of arbitration, or any explanation of the downside of acceding to 
arbitration, these providers failed to satisfy fundamental fairness.  
Only one in three social media providers attempted to explain or 
define arbitration in their TOU (N=16, 33%). By agreeing—often 
unknowingly—to predispute mandatory arbitration and class action 
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waivers,64 social media users give up their right to discovery,65 to a jury 
trial, and to an appeal in a court of law;66 yet only 49 percent (29 out 
of 59) of SNS made any mention of these important facts. Consumer 
arbitration means that the user has no right of appeal—a fact that is 
 
64. Absent a class action waiver, individuals with functionally equivalent 
complaints against a company may join in a class suit or representative 
action where a federal court consolidates the complaints into a single 
proceeding. Arbitration clauses did not typically address the distinction 
between class actions filed in federal and state courts and class action 
arbitrations. Class actions in court have radically different procedural and 
substantive rights than so-called class action arbitrations. For a discussion 
of the differences between court and arbitration class actions, see 
generally AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 
(2011) (citing empirical research that revealed that class arbitrations did 
not result in final award on the merits). 
65. See Claudia Salomon & Samuel de Villiers, The United States 
Federal Arbitration Act: A Powerful Tool for Enforcing 
Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/the-us-fed-arbitration-act (“The 
[Federal Arbitration Act] also empowers arbitrators to call third-party 
witnesses, compel them to appear (and provide any documents they have 
that are material to the case), and hold such witnesses in contempt if they 
fail to comply (9 U.S.C. § 7). However, because arbitrators do not possess 
the authority to enforce compliance with their orders, parties must apply 
to the federal court where the arbitration is seated to obtain any necessary 
enforcement measures.”); see also Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 658 n.53 
(“Arbitral providers will sometimes permit general discovery but this 
requires an application to an arbitrator and is subject to the discretion of 
the arbitrator.”). But cf. Paul Bennett Marrow, When Discovery Seems 
Unavailable, It’s Probably Available, N.Y. St. B. Ass’n J., Oct. 2008, at 
44, available at http://www.marrowlaw.com/articles/pdf/Journal-oct08–
marrow.pdf (arguing that “a myriad of techniques and options are 
available” to receive discovery even when “an arbitrator is uncooperative”). 
JAMS, for example, permits depositions and discovery at the arbitrator’s 
discretion, which is similar to the rule for the AAA. Id. Arbitral providers 
will sometimes permit general discovery, but this requires an application to 
an arbitrator and is subject to the discretion of the arbitrator. 
66. See Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 644 (“Over the past few years, a quiet 
revolution has begun as many social networking sites (SNSs) impose 
predispute mandatory arbitration on consumers. Senator Patrick Leahy 
(D. Vt.) stated, ‘Mandatory arbitration makes a farce of the right to a jury 
trial and the due process guaranteed to all Americans.’ SNSs generally 
require users to enter into two kinds of contractual relationships, terms of 
service agreements and privacy policies, as a condition for accessing their 
websites. Hundreds of millions of consumers enter into mandatory 
arbitration clauses with SNSs through browsewrap, clickwrap, or 
registration forms. After a consumer has registered or accessed a site, SNSs 
reserve the right to modify substantive terms, sometimes without notifying 
users. An SNS, website, or . . . brick-and-mortar company can reduce 
transaction costs by using a predispute mandatory arbitration clause 
because it need not defend lawsuits in state or federal court but in a forum 
where it can choose the arbitral provider and rules to govern the dispute.”). 
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stated in only 17 percent of the sample’s TOU (10 of 59). Only fifteen 
of the fifty-nine providers mentioned that social media users waived 
their legal right to seek remedies in U.S. courts. Few SNS provide basic 
answers to frequently asked questions, links for further information, or 
links to website addresses for the arbitral provider. Only eight social 
media providers (14%) provided consumers with any information about 
how arbitrators were selected. Only nine social media providers gave 
users information on what steps to take to initiate a claim for 
arbitration (15%).  
SNS TOU are too brief to give their customers clear disclosures 
about arbitration or its implications.67 The mean predispute mandatory 
arbitration clause consisted of only 404 words (median=324). Thirty-
six percent of the fifty-nine arbitration clauses were 290 words or fewer. 
Twenty percent of the clauses were fewer than 188 words. An extreme 
example of a social media provider that provided no information about 
arbitration was FC2’s cryptic and unintentionally ironic clause: 
Any disputes resulting from the use of Our Service(s), will be 
resolved through arbitrary [sic] proceedings recognized by the 
state of Nevada. If a resolution cannot be made through 
arbitration, a Nevada State District Court receives exclusive 
jurisdiction rights.68  
With few exceptions, SNS do not provide consumers with a means of 
obtaining additional information regarding the ADR provider, fees, or 
the rights affected by the arbitral clause. More than two out of three 
SNS gave no explanation at all of arbitration or how it works. Only 24 
percent (N=14) provided social media users with any place where they 
could gain additional information regarding arbitration. Only 19 
percent of the social media providers disclosed any of the negative 
consequence of agreeing to arbitration (N=11). Only nine of the fifty-
nine arbitration clauses provided any information on how to submit 
claims to arbitration.   
67. In many cases, a user is bound to both the TOU and privacy policy. See 
User Agreement, LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agree-
ment (last modified Mar. 26, 2014) (“You should carefully read our full 
Privacy Policy before using LinkedIn as it is hereby incorporated into this 
Agreement by reference, and governs our treatment of any information, 
including personally identifiable information you submit to us. Please note 
that certain information, statements, data, and content (such as 
photographs) which you may submit to LinkedIn, or groups you choose 
to join[,] might, or are likely to, reveal your gender, ethnic origin, 
nationality, age, and/or other personal information about you. You 
acknowledge that your submission of any information, statements, data, 
and content to us is voluntary on your part and that LinkedIn may 
process such information, within the terms of the Privacy Policy.”). 
68. Terms of Use, FC2, http://help.fc2.com/common/tos/en/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015). 
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Twenty-nine percent of social media providers mandating arbitra-
tion explained how arbitration works. Eighteen of the fifty-nine arbitral 
clauses posted a warning on the first page of their TOU, advising users 
that the agreement contained an arbitration clause (32%). Only two of 
fifty-nine TOU posted a notice box warning users of the arbitration 
clause. One in five social media providers incorporated an index into 
their TOU (N=12).  
This failure to give customers the minimum disclosures they need 
to make a rational decision about whether to agree to arbitration 
violates the AAA’s consumer due process principle of full and adequate 
disclosures. The AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol requires social 
media providers to “undertake reasonable measures to provide 
Consumers with full and accurate information regarding Consumer 
ADR Programs.”69 Zoosk, an online dating site, provided the most 
comprehensive warning of the fifty-nine arbitral clauses, in bold capital 
letters: 
THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A MANDATORY ARBI-
TRATION OF DISPUTES PROVISION IN SECTION 20 
THAT REQUIRES THE USE OF ARBITRATION ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES, RATHER 
THAN JURY TRIALS OR CLASS ACTIONS.70 
2. Social Media TOU Are Not Reciprocal  
The right to a fair and open hearing in which each party has 
reciprocal obligations is one of the rudiments of fair play in consumer 
arbitration proceedings. “The JAMS Minimum Standards (for both 
consumer arbitrations and employment arbitrations) contain an 
additional limitation on the scope of arbitration agreements, providing 
that arbitration agreements must be ‘reciprocally binding.’”71 The fifty-
nine providers choosing either the AAA or JAMS failed the “reciprocity 
principle” that remedies be functionally equivalent for provider and 
user. In our sample of AAA and JAMS clauses, the provisions were far 
from even handed, favoring the social media provider in nearly every 
respect. In general, the social media providers minimized any duties 
 
69. Consumer Due Process, supra note 60, at 1. 
70. Terms of Use Agreement, Zoosk, https://www.zoosk.com/en/tos?from=si 
gnup (last revised Oct. 7, 2013); see also “Skype Offer” Terms and 
Conditions, Skype, http://static.acer.com/up/Resource/Acer/Images/Land 
ing%20Page/Skype-offer/20131128/EN_Term_and_condition.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015) (“(‘Terms and Conditions’) INCLUDE A MANDA-
TORY AND BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION IN WHICH YOU 
AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES ARISING FROM THESE 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH BINDING 
ARBITRATION.”). 
71. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 23, at 306. 
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owed to their customer while asserting their own rights to the 
maximum. 
The degree of reciprocity in warranties, remedies, and indemnifi-
cation obligations is another unobtrusive measure of fundamental fair-
ness. OnlineRussianBrides is typical in stating in its TOU that the 
provider “in no event [is] liable for any damages whatsoever, whether 
direct, indirect, general, special, compensatory, consequential and/or 
incidental,” arising out of the use of their social network.72 In addition, 
OnlineRussianBrides disclaims liability for punitive damages and lost 
profits from the consumer’s use of their website.73 This asymmetric site 
requires its users to “indemnify and hold OnlineRussianBrides.com, its 
subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, agents, and other partners and 
employees, harmless from any loss, liability, claim, or demand, 
including reasonable attorney’s fee, made by any third party,” arising 
out of the consumer’s use of their service.74  
The indemnification clauses coupled with limitations on damages 
imposed by SNS illustrate the non-reciprocity of this industry’s typical 
TOU. Social media providers are not accountable to their users for any 
causes of action or any category of damages, while their paying 
customers are liable to the limits of the law.75 Forty-nine percent of the 
 
72. Terms of Use Agreement, Online Russian Brides, http://www.online 
russianbrides.com/pages/terms-of-use (last modified Dec. 29, 2012) 
(accessed by search for onlinerussianbrides.com in the Internet Archive 
Index Wayback Machine). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Instagram is an example of a SNS asserting its rights against users, while 
eliminating nearly every type of damages and capping their total liability 
at $100 below the $200 filing fee for consumer arbitration before the AAA. 
Instagram’s limitation of liability clause states that “IN NO EVENT 
WILL THE INSTAGRAM PARTIES TOTAL LIABILITY TO YOU 
FOR ALL DAMAGES, LOSSES OR CAUSES OR ACTION EXCEED 
ONE HUNDRED UNITED STATES DOLLARS ($100.00).” Terms of 
Use, Instagram, http://instagram.com/legal/terms/# (last updated 
Jan. 19, 2013). In contrast, Instagram’s indemnification clause requires 
users to fully indemnify the provider:  
You (and also any third party for whom you operate an account or 
activity on the Service) agree to defend (at Instagram’s request), 
indemnify and hold the Instagram Parties harmless from and 
against any claims, liabilities, damages, losses, and expenses, 
including without limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, 
arising out of or in any way connected with any of the following 
(including as a result of your direct activities on the Service or those 
conducted on your behalf): (i) your Content or your access to or 
use of the Service; (ii) your breach or alleged breach of these Terms 
of Use; (iii) your violation of any third-party right, including 
without limitation, any intellectual property right, publicity, 
confidentiality, property or privacy right; (iv) your violation of any 
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SNS arbitration clauses (29 of 59) permit injunctive relief only to 
protect the SNS, while only 39 percent of the clauses allow injunctive 
relief for the consumer as well (N=23). The right to seek injunctive 
relief is not addressed in 10 percent of the clauses (N=6).  
The limitations of liability and indemnification clauses are 
emblematic of the degree of non-reciprocity found in these clauses.76 
Meetup, for example, caps total damages at the nominal amount of 
$100,77 while consumers may be required to pay the social network 
 
laws, rules, regulations, codes, statutes, ordinances or orders of any 
governmental and quasi-governmental authorities, including, 
without limitation, all regulatory, administrative and legislative 
authorities; or (v) any misrepresentation made by you. You will 
cooperate as fully required by Instagram in the defense of any claim. 
Instagram reserves the right to assume the exclusive defense and 
control of any matter subject to indemnification by you, and you 
will not in any event settle any claim without the prior written 
consent of Instagram.  
Id. 
76. Snapchat’s dispute clause pairs two clauses. The first clause is an 
indemnification clause that states the following:  
By agreeing to these Terms you agree to indemnify, defend and 
hold harmless Snapchat, our managing members, shareholders, 
employees, affiliates, licensors and suppliers (the “Snapchat 
Parties”) from and against any and all complaints, charges, 
claims, damages, losses, costs, liabilities, and expenses (including 
attorneys’ fees) due to, arising out of, or relating in any way to 
(a) your use of the Services; (b) any User Content you post, 
upload, use, distribute, store or otherwise transmit through the 
Services; (c) your violation of these Terms; or (d) your violation 
of the rights of another. 
Snapchat, supra note 12. Snapchat juxtaposes this clause with a limitation 
of liability clause reallocating total responsibility for misuse of their service 
on the user and disclaiming any responsibility for its own wrongdoing. Id. 
(“Except where prohibited by law, in no event will Snapchat or the 
Snapchat Parties be liable for any indirect, special, punitive, incidental, 
exemplary or consequential damages that result from (a) the use of, or 
inability to use, the Services; (b) the provision of the Services or any 
materials available therein; or (c) the conduct of other users of the Services, 
even if Snapchat has been advised of the possibility of such damages. You 
assume total responsibility for your use of the Services.”). 
77. Meetup Terms of Service Agreement, Meetup, http://www.meetup. 
com/terms/ (last modified May 23, 2010) (“You agree that in no event 
shall Meetup be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, special, 
consequential or exemplary damages, including but not limited to, 
damages for loss of profits, goodwill, use, data or other intangible losses 
(even if Meetup has been advised of the possibility of such damages), 
arising out of or in connection with our Platform or this Agreement or 
the inability to use our Platform (however arising, including negligence), 
arising out of or in connection with Third Party Transactions or arising 
out of or in connection with your use of our Platform or transportation 
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provider’s attorneys’ fees per Meetup’s one-sided indemnification 
clause: 
You agree to indemnify and hold us and our officers, directors, 
shareholders, agents, employees, consultants, affiliates, 
subsidiaries and third-party partners harmless from any claim 
or demand, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, made by any 
third party due to or arising out of your breach of your 
representations and warranties or this Agreement or the 
documents it incorporates by reference, your use of our Plat-
form, . . . .78  
Christian Mingle requires users to defend, indemnify, and hold the 
social networking site and its officers, employers, joint venturers, and 
other third parties harmless “for any losses, costs, liabilities or expenses 
relating to or arising out of any third party claim” arising out of the 
user’s postings.79 Christian Mingle makes it clear that the site is not 
liable to its users for damages: 
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLIC-
ABLE LAW, IN NO EVENT WILL WE BE LIABLE TO 
YOU OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON FOR ANY INCI-
DENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INDIRECT DAMAGES 
(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR 
LOSS OF DATA, LOSS OF PROGRAMS, COST OF 
PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE SERVICES OR 
SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS) ARISING OUT OF THE USE 
OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE SERVICE, EVEN IF WE 
OR OUR AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES KNOW OR 
HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH 
DAMAGES.80 
Christian Mingle’s cap on damages, coupled with its imbalanced 
indemnification clause, is emblematic of how social network providers 
violate the reciprocity principle that the provider and consumer have 
parallel rights. 
 
to or from Meetup Gatherings, attendance at Meetup Gatherings, partic-
ipation in or exclusion from Meetup Groups or Meetup Everywheres and 
the actions of you or others at Meetup Gatherings. Our liability to you or 
any third parties in any circumstance is limited to the greater of (a) the 
amount of fees, if any, you pay to us in the twelve (12) months prior to 
the action giving rise to liability, and (b) $100.”). 
78. Id. 
79. Terms of Use, Christian Mingle, http://www.christianmingle.com/ 
terms-of-use.html (last modified Nov. 5, 2013); see also Terms of Service, 
Linden Lab, http://www.lindenlab.com/tos (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
80. Christian Mingle, supra note 79. 
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a. The Dearth of Remedies: How Social Network Providers Cap 
Damages Below the Cost of Filing Consumer Arbitration  
Figure One: Caps on Damages 
 
As Figure One (above) reveals, 96 percent of the SNS TOU capped 
damages at zero dollars, fees paid, or some other nominal amount (57 
of 59). The vast majority of SNS require arbitrators to cap damages at 
a nominal amount that is significantly lower than the consumer’s cost 
of filing, which is $200 under the AAA81 and $250 for JAMS.82 The 
most commonly adopted limit on dollar damages purports to either 
disclaim all responsibility for paying monetary damages or to cap 
liability at zero dollars (37%, N=22). MOG, a music social media site, 
is an emblematic example of a SNS capping damages at zero.83 The 
second most common limitation of liability is to cap monetary damages 
based upon subscription fees paid in the past year or another fixed  
81. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary 
Procedures 12 (2014), available at file:///C:/Users/msd81/Downloads/ 
Consumer-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary%20PROCEDURES 
.pdf (noting that the consumer filing fee is $200 irrespective of whether it 
is an appearance or desk (nonappearance) arbitration). 
82. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
83. MOG, supra note 52 (“IN NO EVENT SHALL MOG OR ITS 
LICENSORS OR ANY OF THEIR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EM-
PLOYEES, AGENTS OR AFFILIATES BE LIABLE FOR ANY 
CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, 
PUNITIVE, OR OTHER DAMAGES WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING, 
WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS 
PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, LOSS OF BUSINESS 
INFORMATION, OR OTHER PECUNIARY LOSS) ARISING OUT OF 
THIS AGREEMENT OR THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE ANY 
SERVICE, EVEN IF MOG HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE 
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.”). 
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period (32%, N=19). Of this group, five social media providers capped 
damages at the amount the user paid over a designated period ranging 
from three months to a year. Gaia Online, for example, capped damages 
at the lesser of the amount the subscriber paid in the preceding twelve 
months or $100.84 When social networking sites did cap damages at an 
amount greater than zero dollars, the most common cap was $11 to 
$100 (17%, N=10). Two providers capped monetary damages at an 
amount between $101 and $500 (3%, N=2). Two other social media 
providers capped damages between $500 and $5,000. Every SNS 
incorporating either an AAA or JAMS arbitration clause disclaimed all 
warranties.  
When the consumer arbitration filing fee exceeds the greatest 
possible outcome, no reasonable consumer will file a claim against a 
social media provider. This cap on damages effectively quashes any 
cause of action. To discover the rate of filings for consumer arbitrations 
filed against SNS, we analyzed AAA and JAMS databases, searching 
for any website that could disclose this information. 85  To our 
knowledge, no prior empirical studies have been conducted on the 
incidence of arbitration filings arising from social media TOU. The best 
circumstantial evidence of fundamental unfairness is that social media 
providers have devised an ADR system that effectively quashes any 
cause of action. 
 
84. Gaia Online, supra note 50 (“IN NO EVENT WILL GAIA OR ITS 
AFFILIATES, CONTRACTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, OR 
THIRD-PARTY PARTNERS, LICENSORS, OR SUPPLIERS TOTAL 
LIABILITY TO YOU FOR ALL DAMAGES, LOSSES, AND CAUSES 
OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THESE TERMS 
OR YOUR USE OF GAIA ONLINE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITA-
TION YOUR INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER GAIA ONLINE 
MEMBERS, (WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT INCLUDING 
NEGLIGENCE, WARRANTY, OR OTHERWISE) EXCEED THE 
AMOUNT PAID BY YOU, IF ANY, FOR ACCESSING GAIA ONLINE 
DURING THE TWELVE (12) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY 
PRECEDING THE DAY THE ACT OR OMISSION OCCURRED 
THAT GAVE RISE TO YOUR CLAIM OR ONE HUNDRED DOLL-
ARS, WHICHEVER IS GREATER.”). 
85. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, Am. Arb. Ass’n, https://www.adr. 
org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer/consumerarbstat;jsessionid=WrtcTqnT
7f5Lv1X2yvJhnmQVL14GVSY2Tw22CLKzSMMcCPDKzhLp!115992763
3?_afrLoop=24487877628203&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=n
ull#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D24487877628203%
26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D1a8vtcy6uw_4 (last vi-
sited Feb. 7, 2015). 
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b. Remediless Social Media Wrongs 
 This section does a content analysis of AAA and JAMS report data 
on filings, settlements, and decisions in favor of either party. 86 
California87 and Maryland88 laws require private arbitration companies 
in that state to publish consumer arbitrations.89 The AAA consumer 
arbitrations database, which consists of 25,139 cases, includes all real 
estate, employment, collection, and traditional consumer cases and 
systematically collects and codes these variables: the name of the non-
consumer party,90 type of disputes,91 salary range for employees in 
employment disputes,92 the prevailing party,93 filing data, disposition 
(decided, withdrawn, settled), disposition date, claim amount by 
business, claim amount by consumer,94 total arbitration fee,95 percent 
 
86. The AAA database contains information for “consumer cases filed after 
January 1, 2003, updated on a quarterly basis, as required by law. Further 
inquiries regarding this notice of the information in this section can be 
directed to the Statistics and In-House Research Department at 
877.495.4185.” Id. (“The AAA provides the provider organization report in 
spreadsheet format. Please note that each row of the spreadsheet does not 
equal one case; each row represents an instance of a consumer or employee 
bringing a claim against the identified business. Therefore, if two consumers 
brought claims against a single business in a single case filing (such as two 
homeowners filing a single case against the same builder), there would be 
two rows in the spreadsheet for that case. Similarly, if a consumer brought 
claims against two businesses (for example, when a consumer files a claim 
against both a car dealer and the manufacturer), that case would receive 
two rows in the spreadsheet. To assist in identifying rows that relate to a 
single case, we have included a ‘Case ID’ column. Rows with the same ‘Case 
ID’ are from the same case. The current data file (Q2 2014) contains17,368 
[sic] records (rows) from 16,436 cases.”). 
87. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 1281.96 (West 2007).  
88. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-3901–3905 (West 2013). 
89. The AAA’s report of consumer arbitration statistics “is made available 
pursuant to state statues such as California Code of Civil Procedure 
§1281.96 and Maryland Commercial Law §§ 14-3901 to 3905.” Id. 
90. Id. (“This is the business or employer involved in the dispute.”). 
91. Id. (“Type of Dispute - This is the general category of the dispute. Note 
that ‘Consumer Pre-Case’ indicates an incomplete request for arbitration 
in which the filing requirements have not been met.”). 
92. Id. (“This is the salary range of the employee involved in the case, as 
provided by the filing party. This is reported only on employment cases.”). 
93. Id. (“If the arbitrator indicates a prevailing party in the award, that 
information is reflected here. This is reported only on awarded cases.”). 
94. Id. (“This is the monetary amount in dispute [as claimed by the consumer 
or employee (non-business party)].”). 
95. Id. (“This is the full amount of arbitrator’s fees and expenses charged on 
the case.”). 
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of fee paid by consumer (or employee), 96  type of disposition, 97 
arbitrator’s name, consumer’s state, whether consumer is self-
represented or not, hearing date, and city and state where the hearing 
was held.  
Table Three (below) presents the first analysis of the frequency of 
SNS arbitrations using this database. In more than a decade of reported 
cases, the AAA reported only four social media arbitrations filed. In 
our sample, forty arbitral providers specified the AAA as provider.98 
Only ten percent of social media providers specifying the AAA as 
provider had a case filed against them in a ten-year period. The data 
are a conservative estimate of the incidence of arbitration because our 
search included filings covering all consumer aspects of these websites, 
not just social media disputes. This finding indicates that the net 
impact of SNS predispute arbitration clauses is to discourage filings—
therefore shielding SNS from any accountability for breach of TOU, 
tort claims, intellectual property rights, privacy violations, or other 
causes of action.99  
 
96. Id. (“This is the percentage of the Total Fee borne by the consumer and 
non-consumer parties.”). 
97. Id. (“This is the manner in which the case was closed. Dispositions 
include: 
Awarded - A case in which the arbitrator was rendered a decision. 
Settled - A case that was closed after the parties reached a mutual 
resolution of the dispute. 
Withdrawn - A case in which the moving party withdrew its claim 
prior to resolution.”). 
98. We searched the AAA consumer arbitration database for the names of 
forty social media providers specifying the AAA as their arbitral provider: 
43Things, 8Tracks, 99Design, Academia, AYI.com, CafeMom, Christian 
Mingle,CouchSurfing,eHarmony, FullCircle, Gaia Online, Geni.com, Hi5, 
Instagram, JDate, Koofers, Match.com, MeetMe (formerly MyYearbook), 
Miverse, Mubi, MyLife, OurTime, Pheed, Pinterest, PureVolume, 
ReverbNation, Russian Brides, Second Life, Senior People Meet, Seniors 
Meet, Skype, SpeedDate.com, Spotify, Squidoo, Tagged, VampireFreaks, 
Virb, Webshots, and WeHeartIt. Of the hundreds of millions of consumers 
using these sites, only three arbitral filings were uncovered during a four-
year period. The AAA Consumer Arbitration database is a complete 
universe of all filings for the 2009–2013 period. 
99. Given the high number of SNS, lawsuits are rare despite the huge 
potential for intentional torts, infringement, and employment-related 
disputes. Cf. E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 
(S.D. Ill. 2012) (enforcing the forum-selection clause in Facebook’s Terms 
of Service); Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (settling class action for failure of the site to secure user’s privacy 
and security); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (holding that Facebook users did not consent to the SNS using their 
names and likenesses to promote service and ruling that the plaintiffs 
sufficiently stated a claim for appropriation of their names and likenesses 
for an advantage, but ruling that the plaintiffs were unable to prove 
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Table Three: AAA Consumer Arbitrations Against Social Media Sites 
Social Media 
Site 
Filing Date Type of 
Disposition 
Claim Amount 
(Consumer) 
Total Fee 
Skype 2/25/2013 Awarded $19,958 $750 
Match.com 2/20/2013 Awarded $74,500 $750 
MyLife.com 3/16/2012 Awarded $750 $125 
Pheed 11/25/09 Awarded $4,160 $750 
 
Only 10 percent of the forty SNS specifying the AAA as the 
provider had a single consumer claim filed against them over a decade; 
no provider had more than a single filing. Each of the four awards was 
a small fraction of what the consumer was seeking. In one case, the 
award was less than the AAA consumer filing fee. This suggests that a 
prior empirical study that concluded that consumers fare as well in 
arbitration as in litigation may have missed the fact that the 
unbalanced TOU screened out all but the most convincing consumer 
complaints, and, therefore, very few consumer arbitrations survived to 
be included in their database.100 At least, this was the case for social 
media providers. It is also possible that the AAA refused to arbitrate 
disputes with these SNS because their terms clearly violated the 
arbiter’s due process protocols.  
Next, we searched the 2,528 JAMS Consumer Arbitration cases 
reported in their Quarterly Report of 2014 consumer arbitration 
disclosures to determine the incidence of arbitral filings for the 
seventeen SNS 101  that required consumers to accede to JAMS 
 
damages); In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011) (dismissing class action by Facebook users based upon the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act as well as California state law); 
Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (filing 
class action against MySpace for alleged violation of the Stored 
Communications Act); In re Google Buzz Privacy Litigation, No. C10–
00672JW., 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (approving $8 
million settlement in class action brought by Gmail users arising out of 
Google’s disclosure of personally identifiable information without 
authorization through the defunct site, Google Buzz). 
100. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical 
Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 
843, 898–900 (2010) (noting that in a study of 301 AAA claims, the 
average consumer prevails in AAA arbitration about half the time and is 
awarded approximately half of what was sought). 
101. AdultFriendFinder, Autospies, Flixster, FriendFinder, Gays.com (English 
only), Habbo, Houzz, Klout, Life360, Meetup, MySpace, PerfectMatch, 
Popsugar USA, QuantiMD, Raptr, Remind101, SnapChat, WordPress, 
and Zoosk are the nineteen social network sites that require arbitrations 
before JAMs. 
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arbitration proceedings.102 Not a single social media user filed a claim 
against the seventeen SNS specifying JAMS as the arbitral provider. 
This paucity of arbitral filings is the best evidence that arbitration 
clauses are stacked against the consumer. It is implausible that the 
hundreds of millions of users subject to mandatory arbitration never 
have a contractual dispute or other cause of action against SNS. 
LinkedIn, for example, has 255 million users.103 Cybercriminals misap-
propriated six million LinkedIn passwords, posting them “on under-
ground sites frequented by hackers,”104 but not a single arbitration was 
filed alleging damages from negligent security.  
SNS benefit greatly from shunting cases to arbitration under 
imbalanced rules because the TOU, for all practical purposes, cannibal-
ize all civil remedies under the legal fiction of voluntarily negotiated 
contract. Consumer-forced arbitration in social media disputes is tort 
reform in disguise because arbitration clauses have a chilling impact on 
claims. The social network providers have created what is, in effect, a 
liability-free zone that insulates them from paying consequential 
damages or other significant remedies for any cause of action.105  
By acceding to predispute mandatory arbitration, class action 
preclusions,106 and waivers of all meaningful remedies, social media 
 
102. JAMS Disclosures for Consumer Arbitrations, JAMS, http://www.jam 
sadr.com/consumer-arbitration-disclosures/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
103. Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites: September 2014, eBizMBA, 
http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015). 
104. Paragon Fin. Ltd., Social Media Industry Continue to Struggle After 
Facebook IPO, Marketwired (June 13, 2012, 8:20 ET), http://www. 
marketwired.com/press-release/Social-Media-Industry-Continue-to-
Struggle-After-Facebook-IPO-1668805.htm. 
105. See Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 645 (“A social media company can 
dodge jury verdicts, punitive damages, class actions, consequential 
damages, and any other meaningful remedy by requiring their users to 
submit to arbitration. One-sided terms of use that, in effect, divest 
consumers of fundamental rights raise serious concerns of procedural and 
substantive unfairness. ‘Users of ADR are entitled to a process that is 
fundamentally fair.’ Social networking sites have designed arbitration 
agreements that operate as poison pills that eliminate minimum adequate 
rights and remedies for consumers, while preserving the full array of 
remedies for these virtual businesses.”).  
106. Absent a class action waiver, individuals with functionally equivalent 
complaints against a company may join in a class suit or representative 
action where a federal court consolidates the complaints into a single 
proceeding. Arbitration clauses did not typically address the distinction 
between class actions filed in federal and state courts and class action 
arbitrations. Class actions in court have radically different procedural and 
substantive rights than so-called class action arbitrations. For a discussion 
of the differences between court and arbitration class actions, see AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (citing 
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users forfeit the right to discovery,107 a jury trial, and an appeal in a 
court of law.108 The supporters of predispute arbitration contend that 
this ADR procedure is beneficial for the great majority of consumers.109 
Our data indicate that the reverse is true. Mandatory arbitration, under 
the one-sided terms specified by most social networking TOU, 
efficiently and effectively eliminates liability.110 
Klout, for example, a social media site and mobile application that 
ranks the importance of users based on their online influence, creates a 
coercive contracting environment, where it can press its legal rights to 
the maximum, while disclaiming all warranties and limiting liability for 
its conduct.111 Klout’s 6,198-word TOU is composed of 120 paragraphs.  
empirical research that revealed that class arbitrations did not result in 
final award on the merits). 
107. Arbitral providers will sometimes permit general discovery, but this 
requires an application to an arbitrator and is subject to the discretion of 
the arbitrator. See Marrow, supra note 65, at 44–46. JAMS, for example, 
permits depositions and discovery at the arbitrator’s discretion, which is 
similar to the rule for the AAA. Id. 
108. See Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 644 (“Over the past few years, a quiet 
revolution has begun as many social networking sites (SNSs) impose 
predispute mandatory arbitration on consumers. Senator Patrick Leahy (D. 
Vt.) stated, ‘Mandatory arbitration makes a farce of the right to a jury trial 
and the due process guaranteed to all Americans.’ SNSs generally require 
users to enter into two kinds of contractual relationships, terms of service 
agreements and privacy policies, as a condition for accessing their websites. 
Hundreds of millions of consumers enter into mandatory arbitration clauses 
with SNSs through browsewrap, clickwrap, or registration forms. After a 
consumer has registered or accessed a site, SNSs reserve the right to modify 
substantive terms, sometimes without notifying users. An SNS, website, or 
other brick-and-mortar company can reduce transaction costs by using a 
predispute mandatory arbitration clause because it need not defend lawsuits 
in state or federal court but in a forum where it can choose the arbitral 
provider and rules to govern the dispute.”). 
109. See Sternlight, supra note 19, at 1633–34 (discussing the benefits of 
mandatory arbitration for both consumers and companies).  
110. See Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 645 (“A social media company can 
dodge jury verdicts, punitive damages, class actions, consequential dam-
ages, and any other meaningful remedy by requiring their users to submit 
to arbitration. One-sided terms of use that, in effect, divest consumers of 
fundamental rights raise serious concerns of procedural and substantive 
unfairness.”). 
111. Klout’s indemnification clause in its terms of service states the following:  
You agree to release, indemnify and hold Klout and its affiliates 
and their officers, employees, directors and agents harmless from 
any and all losses, damages, expenses, including reasonable attor-
neys’ fees, rights, claims, actions of any kind and injury (including 
death) arising out of or relating to your use of the Services, any 
User Content, your connection to the Services, your violation of 
these Terms of Services or your violation of any rights of another.  
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A Klout registrant would have to read 110 paragraphs of text (4,966 
words) before reaching Klout’s arbitration clause. Klout requires its 
users to submit to arbitration in San Francisco, California, before a 
single JAMS arbitrator “in accordance with the rules and regulations 
promulgated by JAMS unless specifically modified in the Terms of 
Service.”112  
Klout’s TOU are manifestly unbalanced because a consumer has no 
realistic ability to vindicate her claims.113  Its consumer arbitration 
clause caps monetary damages at a mere $100,114 which is $150 less 
than the mandatory, nonrefundable filing fee that a consumer must pay 
to initiate a JAMS consumer arbitration.115 Klout imposes a rule where 
“[t]he arbitrator may, in his or her discretion, assess costs and expenses 
(including the reasonable legal fees and expenses of the prevailing part) 
against any party to a proceeding.”116 Houzz, a home design social 
network, asserts a “loser pays” rule that applies if the consumer 
challenges the enforceability of arbitration and loses.117 
Tort reformers have long sought “loser pays” rules in consumer 
lawsuits, precisely to dissuade consumers from filing claims. 118 
 
Klout, supra note 5. In contrast, Klout’s disclaimer clause eliminates all 
responsibility for warranties. Id. Similarly, Klout caps total dollar 
damages at $100 eliminating every category of monetary damages. Id. 
(Limitation of Liability Clause). 
112. Id. (Arbitration). 
113. See JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
114. Klout, supra note 5 (“The arbitrator will not have the power to award 
damages in excess of the limitation on actual compensatory, direct 
damages set forth in the Terms of Service and may not multiply actual 
damages or award punitive damages or any other damages that are 
specifically excluded under the Terms of Service, and each party hereby 
irrevocably waives any claim to such damages.”). 
115. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2 (“With respect to the cost of the arbitration, 
when a consumer initiates arbitration against the company, the only fee 
required to be paid by the consumer is $250, which is approximately 
equivalent to current Court filing fees.”). 
116. See Klout, supra note 5 (Arbitration). 
117. Terms of Use Agreement, Houzz, http://www.houzz.com/termsofuse 
(last updated Jan. 16, 2014) (“If any arbitration or other proceeding is 
brought to enforce or interpret this Agreement or matters relating to it, 
the substantially prevailing party, as determined by the arbitrator’s 
award, will be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and other 
costs and expenses incurred in such arbitration or proceeding from the 
other party, in addition to any other relief to which such prevailing party 
is entitled; provided that in no event will the arbitrator have the authority 
to award punitive damages.”).  
118. Tami Kamin-Meyer, Surprise! Conservative Think Tank Study Again 
Suggests That “Loser-Pays” Is Right for America: Even a Defense Attorney 
Agrees It Would Have a Chilling Effect on Filing of Many Meritorious Suits, 
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Consumers are very rarely in a financial position to be able to risk 
paying the attorneys’ fees and other costs of a social media provider, 
particularly when the maximum payout is capped at only $100. Such a 
fee-shifting provision is unduly burdensome to the consumer—if not 
substantively unconscionable.119 Even in the unlikely event that the 
consumer incurs no travel, lodging, or attorneys’ fees, the cost of filing 
alone is more than twice the maximum amount that the arbitrator can 
award.120 Klout’s TOU does not disclose if the website pays the cost of 
hiring the arbitrator, the room, and other expenses, as required by 
JAMS’s procedural fairness statement.121  
3. AAA Principle 2: Access to Information122 
a. Social Media’s Affirmative Duty to Inform  
The AAA requires providers of goods and services such as social 
networks to “undertake reasonable measures to provide Consumers 
with full and accurate information regarding Consumer ADR 
Programs.” 123  To comply with the AAA’s Consumer Due Process 
Protocol, a SNS employing consumer arbitration must give the 
consumer “(1) clear and adequate notice regarding the ADR provisions, 
including a statement indicating whether participation in the ADR 
Program is mandatory or optional, and (2) reasonable means by which 
 
Plaintiff Mag., Mar. 2009, available at http://www.plaintiffmagazine. 
com/Mar09/Kamin-Meyer_Surprise%20-%20Conservative%20think%20 
tank%20study%20again%20suggests%20that%20loser-pays%20is%20right 
%20for%20America_Plaintiff%20magazine.pdf 
119. Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 284 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“[A]n arbitration provision that makes the arbitral forum 
prohibitively expensive for a weaker party is unconscionable.”). 
120. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998) (reporting that Gateway’s arbitration clause required 
customers with claims less than $50,000 to pay an advance fee of $4,000, 
which was greater than any of the defendant’s products). 
121. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2; Klout, supra note 5.  
122. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59, at 1 (“Providers of goods or 
services should undertake reasonable measures to provide Consumers with 
full and accurate information regarding Consumer ADR Programs. At the 
time the Consumer contracts for goods or services, such measures should 
include (1) clear and adequate notice regarding the ADR provisions, 
including a statement indicating whether participation in the ADR 
Program is mandatory or optional, and (2) reasonable means by which 
Consumers may obtain additional information regarding the ADR 
Program. After a dispute arises, Consumers should have access to all 
information necessary for effective participation in ADR.”).  
123. Id. 
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Consumers may obtain additional information regarding the ADR 
Program.”124  
JAMS’s parallel due process principle states that “[t]he consumer 
must be given notice of the arbitration clause. Its existence, terms, 
conditions and implications must be clear.”125 For 50 percent of the 
AAA clauses, a user would have to read at least 4,967 words just to 
reach the first word of the arbitration clause. Only one out of the forty 
social media providers specifying the AAA gave users an opportunity 
to opt out of mandatory arbitration. Even in this sole exception, the 
opt-out right is illusory because Instagram gives users only thirty days 
from the date the TOU was originally posted to opt out, which means 
that the window to exercise this option has long since passed.126 For the 
nineteen JAMS social media arbitral clauses, no SNS offered an 
opportunity to opt out of arbitration. In contrast, a quarter of clauses 
in checking account and credit card contracts allowed consumers to opt 
out of arbitration.127 
b. AAA and JAMS Arbitral Clauses Fail to Inform Users 
SNS TOU are standard form contracts marketed to consumers with 
identical terms for all users and no likelihood of individual 
negotiation.128 Standard-form licenses are broadly enforceable so long 
as the license satisfies three conditions: (1) the customer has an 
opportunity to review the terms of the license, (2) the user manifests 
assent after having an opportunity to review the terms, and (3) the 
 
124. Id. 
125. JAMS, supra note 42, at 2. 
126. Instagram, supra note 75. 
127. Cordray, supra note 21 (“About one-quarter of the clauses contained in 
checking account and credit card contracts allow consumers to opt out of 
the arbitration requirement. For those that allow it, consumers usually 
have to submit a signed document by mail within a set time frame—
usually thirty or sixty days from when the account was opened or the 
agreement was mailed.”). 
128. See Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act § 102(a)(45) (amended 
2002), 7 U.L.A. 217 (2009) (defining “Mass-market transaction” to mean: 
“(A) a consumer contract; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user 
licensee if: (i) the transaction is for information or informational rights 
directed to the general public as a whole, including consumers, under 
substantially the same terms for the same information; (ii) the licensee 
acquires the information or informational rights in a retail transaction 
under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in 
a retail market; and (iii) the transaction is not: (I) a contract for 
redistribution or for public performance or public display of a copyrighted 
work; (II) a transaction in which the information is customized or 
otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other than 
minor customization using a capability of the information intended for 
that purpose; (III) a site license; or (IV) an access contract.”). 
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actions are “attributable in law” to the customer.129 More than three 
out of four social media providers (76%, N=45), however, predicate 
contract formation on browsewrap that purports to bind the user without 
any affirmative act. Forty out of fifty-nine TOU with AAA or JAMS 
clauses assert aggressive rolling contract provisions that give the SNS the 
right to change the terms after contract formation at will. Houzz, for 
example, states that it has the right to change its service agreement and 
the TOU at will: 
We reserve the right at any time, with or without cause, to: 
  change the terms and conditions of this Agreement;  
 change the Website, including eliminating or 
discontinuing any Information or Services or other 
feature of the Website; or  
  deny or terminate your use of and/or access to the 
Website. 
Any changes we make will be effective immediately upon our 
making such changes available on the Website or otherwise 
providing notice thereof. You agree that your continued use of 
the Website after such changes constitutes your acceptance of 
such changes. You hereby acknowledge that you have carefully 
read all of the terms and conditions of our Privacy Policy 
(which can be accessed at http://houzz.com/ 
privacypolicy) and agree to all such terms and conditions. Be 
sure to return to this page periodically to ensure familiarity 
with the most current version of this Agreement.130 
Seventeen of the nineteen SNS choosing JAMS as the arbitral provider 
impose rolling contract terms that can be changed at will by the 
provider but not the consumer (89.5%). Sixty-six percent of the social 
networks choosing the AAA as the provider structure their TOU as a 
rolling contract (N=26).131 Users must check periodically for current 
 
129. Id. § 112, cmt. 2. 
130. Houzz, supra note 117. 
131. LinkedIn, supra note 67 (“You must comply with all applicable laws and 
this Agreement, as may be amended from time to time with or without 
advance notice, and the policies and processes explained in the following 
sections and related webpages.”); see also Terms of Use, Academia.edu, 
http://www.academia.edu/terms (last updated Mar. 13, 2013) 
(“Academia.edu reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to modify the Site, 
Services and these Terms, at any time and without prior notice. If we 
modify these Terms we will post the modification on the Site or provide 
you with notice of the modification. We will also update the “Last Updated 
Date” at the top of these Terms. By continuing to access or use the Site or 
Services after we have posted a modification on the Site or have provided 
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terms because their continued use constitutes acceptance of any new 
terms, even if the user is unaware of any changes.132  
Social media providers made little attempt to draw users’ attention 
to the presence of arbitration clauses, burying them deep within the 
TOU or service agreement. Courts have rejected agreements where a 
licensor makes little effort to draw attention to pro-licensor terms. In 
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,133 the developer of “Second Life,” an 
online virtual world developed by the defendant, confiscated the 
plaintiff’s virtual property and removed him from the website.134 The 
plaintiff filed suit, and Linden Research responded by filing a motion 
to compel arbitration based on their arbitration agreement. The court 
found the arbitration agreement to be procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable because it was obscurely situated deep in 
take-it-or-leave-it TOU.  
The Bragg court found lack of mutuality and that Second Life failed 
to give Bragg sufficient information on the costs and rules of 
arbitration, as required by the rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce.135 The court reasoned that Second Life could have easily 
explained the arbitration procedure in either its TOU or through a 
hyperlink to another page. In our sample, only a handful of the 
providers explained the arbitration procedure or provided a hyperlink 
where they could learn about the arbitration rules.  
The mandatory predispute binding arbitration clauses in SNS’ 
TOU typically were written in impenetrable legalese and placed where 
they were almost certain to go unnoticed. The first word in the 
arbitration clause of the fifty-nine AAA and JAMS clauses was buried 
5,662 words deep in the TOU (median 5,360 words). Because of the 
 
you with notice of a modification, you are indicating that you agree to be 
bound by the modified Terms. If the modified Terms are not acceptable to 
you, your only recourse is to cease using the Site and Services.”). 
132. E.g., Terms of Service, Tagged, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_ 
service.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2014) (“Tagged reserves the right to 
change or amend this Agreement at any time, for any reason, or for no 
reason at all, at Tagged’s sole discretion. The most recent version of this 
Agreement will be posted on the Tagged website. Although Tagged will 
provide notice of material changes to this Agreement on the Tagged 
website, as a Member it is your sole responsibility to keep yourself informed 
of any such changes or amendments. Should a Member object to any terms 
and conditions of the Agreement or any subsequent changes to the 
Agreement or become dissatisfied with Tagged in any way, Member’s only 
solution is to immediately: (1) discontinue use of Tagged; (2) terminate 
their Tagged registration; and (3) notify Tagged of termination.”).  
133. 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  
134. Id. at 597.  
135. Id. at 611. 
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obscure location of the arbitration clause, social media users are likely 
to be unaware that they have waived their right to go to court.  
c. Difficult-to-Read Arbitration Terms 
 The duty to read is a long-standing principle in Anglo-American 
contract law, but there is no concomitant duty of providers to make 
terms readable.136 Critics argue that the opportunity to read maxim is 
a legal fiction because consumers almost never review the boilerplate137 
and that courts and commentators need to abandon the “opportunity 
to read” requirement as signifying meaningful assent.138 To assess the 
readability of the fifty-nine arbitration clauses selecting the AAA or 
JAMS, we tested each TOU text using the Flesch Reading Ease 
Formula, 139  which is a standard measure for determining 
comprehensibility. The readability tests did not rate a single social  
136. See, e.g., Hoshaw v. Cosgriff, 247 F. 22, 26 (8th Cir. 1917) (“[A] person, 
having the capacity and opportunity to read a contract, cannot avoid the 
contract . . . if he signs it without reading, where there are no special 
circumstances excusing his failure to read it. It is the duty of every 
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a contract before he 
signs and delivers it.”); Lenox Manor, Inc. v. Gianni, 120 Misc. 2d 202, 204 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (stating that “basic contract law holds that an 
individual has a duty to read a contract and is responsible for the provisions 
contained in it” and there is “no discernible legislative or common-law 
prohibition” to preauthorized electronic fund transfers); Edith R. 
Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 476 (2008) (“[T]raditional 
contract doctrine imposes on the parties a ‘duty to read.’ Accordingly, if a 
party objectively manifests assent to be bound to a contract (for example, 
by signing a written contract document), a court will almost automatically 
find assent to all terms contained in the writing. Courts meet parties’ 
excuses such as, ‘I didn’t read it’ or ‘I didn’t understand it’ with little 
sympathy, except in cases where more important policies are expressed in 
the traditional contract defenses.”). See also 1 Richard A. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 4:19 (4th ed. 2007) (“According to the 
objective theory of contract formation, what is essential is not assent, but 
rather what the person to whom a manifestation is made is justified as 
regarding as assent. Thus, if an offeree, in ignorance of the terms of an offer, 
so acts or expresses itself as to justify the offeror in inferring assent, and 
this action or expression was of such a character that a reasonable person 
in the position of the offeree should have known it was calculated to lead 
the offeror to believe that the offer had been accepted, a contract will be 
formed in spite of the offeree’s ignorance of the terms of the offer.”). 
137. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Con-
tract Law, 5 Eur. Rev. Cont. L. 1, 15 (2009). 
138. Id. at 6. 
139. The Flesch Reading Ease test was developed by Rudolf Flesch sixty-five 
years ago and is the most widely used test for readability. See generally 
Rudolf Flesch, The Art of Readable Writing 175–86, 247–51 
(1974) (describing the Flesch Reading Ease Score methodology). 
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media TOU to be “easy” or “fairly easy” to comprehend. As Figure 
Two (below) indicates, the overwhelming conclusion was that TOU 
were difficult or fairly difficult to comprehend. Terms of use written at 
a standard level were by far the smallest category. The largest category 
of TOU was drafted to be fairly difficult to read, while difficult TOU 
were the second largest category. 
 
Figure Two: TOU Are Difficult to Read 
 Recode of Flesch into Very Easy Low # to Very Difficult High # 
  
A score of sixty is considered the standard readability score under 
the Flesch Reading Ease Formula.140 Scores higher than sixty are more 
readable than the standard. The mean readability of the social media 
TOU specifying the AAA or JAMS as providers is fifty-one 
(median=53), which is nine points more challenging to understand than 
what is considered a standard score. Under the Flesch-Kincaid Reading 
Ease Test, text scored as fifty-one is classified as “fairly difficult” to 
comprehend. Similarly, the Flesch-Kincaid grade level for the AAA and 
JAMS TOU was grade 11.3 (median=11), as Figure Three (below) 
reveals. When TOU are very hard to understand, the dominant party 
can impose one-sided terms that harm the unsophisticated party.141 
Because consumer arbitration clauses impose many restrictions on 
 
140.  Id. at 177.  
141. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing 
Arbitration Provisions, 81 St. John’s L. Rev. 123, 161 (2007) (“Little-
guy consumers may therefore become subject to form arbitration 
provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without understanding or 
experience with arbitration.” Furthermore, “[r]epeat-players’ form 
provisions may augment consumers bargaining disadvantages by 
impairing consumers’ legal rights and remedies.”). 
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consumers’ legal rights, they should, at a minimum, be understandable 
by the average user. 
 
Figure Three: Grade Level to Understand Terms of Use 
 
 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
 
The rights-foreclosure clauses in the social media TOU were written 
at a much higher-grade level than the TOU as a whole. The average 
readability of the fifty-nine AAA or JAMS arbitral clauses was at the 
grade fifteen level, the reading ability of a junior in college, which 
precludes the possibility that the typical user will understand them.142 
The average American comprehends at between an eighth and ninth 
grade reading level according to the largest existing study,143 and there 
is no evidence that the reading levels have improved since this two-
decades-old research.144 The net effect of incomprehensible provisions,  
142. See id. at 160 (stating “consumers rarely read or understand” predispute 
mandatory arbitration agreements). 
143. See Irwin S. Kirsch et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., 
Adult Literacy in America: A First Look at the Findings of 
the National Adult Literacy Survey (3d ed. 2002), nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs93/93275.pdf. 
144. Kimberly Hefling, American Adults Score Poorly on Global Test, 
Associated Press (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/ 
article/us-adults-score-below-average-worldwide-test (using cross-
national statistics from Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development to show that Americans lag between most other developed 
nations in reading and mathematics skills). 
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coupled with one-sided terms, is to produce an imbalanced agreement 
that lacks due process fundamental fairness.  
Twitter’s TOU, for example, are drafted at a reading level between 
grade eighteen and nineteen.145 Drafted for a person with almost twenty 
years of education, Twitter’s dense warranty disclaimer provision is 
indecipherable to anyone without advanced training. 146  The use of 
unnecessarily opaque terms like “herein” and the failure of the SNS to 
explain what rights are erased seem calculated to obscure the 
implications of the terms of the “agreement” rather than to educate the 
consumer.  
Figure Four: Grade Level Required to Understand 
Social Media Arbitration Clauses 
  
Figure Four (above) reveals that the SNS arbitration clauses were 
generally more complex than the TOU as a whole, being rated as 
“difficult” or “very confusing” and requiring an average educational 
level of fourteen years of schooling to understand. The Flesch Reading 
 
145. Free Text Readability Consensus Calculator, Readability Formulas, 
http://www.readabilityformulas.com/free-readability-formula-tests.php 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (“The Flesch Reading Ease formula will 
output a number from 0 to 100—a higher score indicates easier 
reading. An average document has a Flesch Reading Ease score between 
6 [and] 70. As a rule of thumb, scores of 90–100 can be understood by 
an average 5th grader. 8th and 9th grade students can understand 
documents with a score of 60–70; and college graduates can understand 
documents with a score of 0–30.”). 
146. Id. (“The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level outputs a U.S. school grade level; 
this indicates the average student in that grade level can read the text. 
For example, a score of 7.4 indicates that the text is understood by an 
average student in 7th grade.”). 
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Ease Readability score was 34.5, almost twenty points more difficult 
than the TOU as a whole and twenty-five points below the standard 
score of sixty. Only one of the fifty-nine clauses was “fairly easy” to 
read, with a Flesch Reading Ease score between seventy and seventy-
nine.  
Five social media arbitration clauses were “fairly difficult.” Fifty-
three out of fifty-nine consumer arbitration clauses were either 
“difficult” (N=30) or “very confusing” (N=23). The mean Flesch 
Reading Ease score for the arbitration clauses was thirty-four, which is 
classified as “difficult” to read (median=34). The aggregate readability 
score for the arbitration clause was grade fourteen as compared to grade 
eleven for the TOU. Our findings are consistent with a study prepared 
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which found that 
arbitration clauses in consumer credit agreements were almost always 
more unreadable than the other parts of the contract.147 
d. Neither AAA nor JAMS Clauses Specify the Disadvantages of 
Arbitration 
Predispute consumer arbitration does not provide for judicially 
monitored discovery, apply rules of evidence, allow a jury to decide the 
case, or recognize a right of appeal. Only 28 percent of the SNS 
specifying the AAA attempted to explain what arbitration involves (11 
of 40). Fifty percent of the forty AAA arbitral clauses give the SNS 
user notice that they are foreclosing their Seventh Amendment right to 
jury (N=20). Only three out of the forty AAA clauses mentioned that 
social media users have no judicially monitored right of discovery.  
Similarly, only five out of nineteen JAMS clauses mentioned 
whether the user retained their right to discovery. No social media 
provider’s clause mentioned that discovery is not judicially supervised 
in arbitration proceedings. Only two of the nineteen SNS that chose 
JAMS as the provider warned users that they lose the right to an 
appeal. Yet with mandatory arbitration, there is no right to appeal 
even if the arbitrator erroneously applies the law or misstates the 
facts.148 
4. AAA Principle 5: Retaining Access to Small Claims Courts  
The AAA’s Principle 5 states that “[c]onsumer ADR Agreements 
should make it clear that all parties retain the right to seek relief in a 
small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of its 
 
147. Cordray, supra note 21. 
148. A content analysis of the arbitration clauses cannot reveal whether Prin-
ciples 3 and 4 are satisfied. AAA Principle 3 is whether arbitration is 
independent, impartial and decided by a neutral with independent admin-
istration. Principle 4 requires the quality and competence of neutral 
arbitrations. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59, at 2. 
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jurisdiction.”149 JAMS Principle 1 parallels this provision: “no party 
shall be precluded from seeking remedies in small claims court for 
disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction.”150 Contrary to 
AAA Consumer Due Process Principle 5 and JAMS Principle 1, three 
out of four SNS (N=43), with the AAA or JAMS as the arbitral 
provider, preclude the possibility that consumers can seek relief in small 
claims courts (73%). Twenty-seven of the forty social media specifying 
the AAA as the arbitral provider did not allow users to pursue small 
claims as opposed to arbitration. A slightly higher percentage of JAMS 
clauses precluded the possibility of small claims. (79% or 15 of 19). 
Some courts are skeptical of providers that do not permit consumers 
to opt out of arbitration in order to pursue small claims. In Scarcella 
v. America Online,151 a New York trial court refused to enforce a forum 
selection clause in a clickwrap license because it violated a state policy 
favoring the simplified proceedings of small claims court for low-value 
disputes. These cases are the exception, as most U.S. courts will enforce 
choice of forum clauses that divest consumers of their right to litigate 
in their home court.152  
Gays.com, the leading social networking site for LGBTs, requires 
its users to appear before three arbitrators in Shanghai, China, under 
its arbitral clause that specifies JAMS as the provider, applying the 
 
149. Id. 
150. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
151. No. 1168/04, 2004 WL 2093429, at *3 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004). 
152. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook, https:// 
www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Nov. 15, 2013) (imposing a 
choice of forum clause that requires consumers to litigate in their home 
forum in California: “You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute 
(claim) you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or 
Facebook exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California or a state court located in San Mateo County, and you agree to 
submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts for the purpose of 
litigating all such claims. The laws of the State of California will govern 
this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you and us, 
without regard to conflict of law provisions.”); Lee Goldman, My Way and 
the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in 
Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 700, 722 (1992) (“For many 
consumers, however, the additional costs of litigation—including their own 
and their witnesses’ airfares to attend a distant trial and the increased 
attorney fees mandated by the need for local counsel—will impose serious 
burdens. These costs often will constitute a significant share of the 
consumer’s disposable income. For some, the hardships of suit in a foreign 
forum will be prohibitive. The consequences likely will be several hidden, 
but significant, costs. Consumers may view enforcement of forum clauses as 
depriving them of their day in court, not to mention compensation for, 
perhaps, grievous injury.”); Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010) (“Arbitration provisions, this Court has noted, 
are a species of forum-selection clauses.”). 
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laws of Hong Kong.153 One Travel offers a one-way $1,018 ticket on 
American Airlines from Boston’s Logan Airport to Shanghai’s Hongqiao 
Airport. Cheap Tickets’ least expensive ticket from Boston to Hong 
Kong was $1,253 on August 11, 2014. The cheapest return option was 
also $1,253. The cost of air travel to Hong Kong or Shanghai would be 
100 times or greater than the typical recovery.154 A consumer seeking 
to challenge Gays.com’s arbitral clause will realize after consultation 
with their attorney, “I’ve been shanghaied.”155 Gays.com does not give 
consumers the option of filing in small claims court; they must appear 
in Shanghai or Hong Kong, which is, in effect, an anti-remedy. Figure 
Five (below) confirms that relatively few SNS allow consumers to file 
actions in local small claims courts, which is less expensive than 
consumer arbitration, even if the provider pays for the arbitrator and 
all other expenses.156  
 
153. Terms of Service, Gays.com, http://www.gays.com/conditions (last 
updated Apr. 30, 2008) (“Except to the extent applicable law, if any, 
provides otherwise, this Agreement, any access to or use of the Website 
will be governed by the laws of Hong Kong, S.A.R., China, excluding its 
conflict of law provisions, and the proper venue for any disputes arising 
out of or relating to any of the same will be the state and federal courts 
located in Shanghai, China. Except for claims for injunctive or equitable 
relief or claims regarding intellectual property rights (which may be 
brought in any competent court without the posting of a bond), any 
dispute arising under this Agreement shall be finally settled in accordance 
with the Comprehensive Arbitration Rules of the Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Service, Inc. (“JAMS”) by three arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with such Rules. The arbitration shall take place in Hong 
Kong, in the English language and the arbitral decision may be enforced 
in any court. The prevailing party in any action or proceeding to enforce 
this Agreement shall be entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees.”).  
154. While the basic service of Gays.com is free, “[c]ertain other services are 
provided for free only to beta users.” Id. What’s probable is that dollar 
recovery for a user’s contractual dispute is likely to be far less than $250, 
which is the JAMS filing fee for consumer arbitration. However, Gays.com 
does not refer to consumer arbitration and requires all disputes to be 
heard by three arbitrators in Hong Kong. The Gays.com arbitration clause 
states that “[a]greement shall be finally settled in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules of the Judicial Arbitration and 
Mediation Service, Inc. (“JAMS”) by three arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with such Rules.” Id. Neither the TOU nor the arbitration 
clause makes reference to the provider subsidizing the cost of hiring the 
three arbitrators, renting the room for the hearing, or other expenses. Id. 
155. Shanghaiing means “the practice of drugging, tricking, intoxicating, or 
otherwise illegally inducing a person to work aboard a vessel . . . .” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1500 (9th ed. 2009). Social media users 
acceding to arbitration have clicked agreement to Gays.com TOU and 
must either appear in Shanghai or Hong Kong or forego any remedy.  
156. Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness 
Act, It’s All About Separation of Powers, 12 J. Consumer & Com. L. 
151, n.55 (2009) (“Although most small claims courts provide a judge and 
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Figure Five: Incidence of SNS Permitting 
Small Claims Court as an Option 
 
 
 
For the SNS choosing either AAA or JAMS arbitration, only 
sixteen out of fifty-nine providers allowed claimants to pursue a remedy 
in small claims court (27%). Seventy-three percent of the providers 
made no mention of an option to pursue small claims, which violates 
the protocol principle that consumers be allowed to pursue small claims 
as an inexpensive alternative to forced arbitration. The small claims 
preclusion effectively slams the door shut on small dollar claims in 
arbitration proceedings. Skype’s consumer TOU agreement is an 
exception in permitting users to file small claims in their county of 
residence.157 The banning of small claims is just one example of the 
systematic violation of the more general fundamental fairness principle 
of “reasonable cost.” 
 
jury for less than $100, the costs of arbitration far exceed this amount. A 
recent study by Public Citizen concludes that the costs of arbitration 
almost always exceed the costs of litigation.”). 
157. Skype’s USA Consumer Terms of Use, Skype, http://www.skype.com/ 
en/legal/tou-usa/ (last updated June 2014) (“You may also litigate any 
dispute in a small claims court in your county of residence, King County, 
Washington, or Santa Clara County, California, if the dispute meets all 
requirements to be heard in the small claims court. You may litigate in a 
small claims court whether or not you negotiated informally first.”). 
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5. AAA Principle 6: Reasonable Cost  
Figure Six: Social Media Providers Paying Costs of Arbitration
 
a. SNS Are Unclear About the Allocation of Arbitration Costs  
AAA Principle 6 requires providers to develop arbitration and other 
ADR programs where the cost is calibrated to the nature of goods or 
services “and the ability of the Consumer to pay.”158 Under the AAA’s 
Consumer Due Process Protocol, the business must pay the cost of 
arbitration, the room, and other expenses other than the $200 filing 
fee.159 JAMS Principle 7 also makes it clear that consumers are not 
responsible for paying the cost of the arbitrator or room: 
With respect to the cost of the arbitration, when a consumer 
initiates arbitration against the company, the only fee required 
to be paid by the consumer is $250, which is approximately 
equivalent to current Court filing fees. All other costs must be 
borne by the company including any remaining JAMS Case 
Management Fee and all professional fees for the arbitrator’s 
services. When the company is the claiming party initiating 
 
158. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59, at 19. 
159. Id. (“Providers of goods and services should develop ADR programs which 
entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the 
dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the 
nature of goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to 
pay. In some cases, this may require the Provider to subsidize the process.”).  
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arbitration against the consumer, the company will be required 
to pay all costs associated with the arbitration.160 
Figure Six (above) reveals that social media providers are systemat-
ically violating this AAA Consumer Due Process Principle. 
The majority of SNS fail to inform consumers that the provider will 
subsidize the cost of arbitration; eleven providers misleadingly state the 
cost of consumer arbitration is split or make ambiguous statements 
about the allocation of expenses. Meetup, a social media provider 
choosing JAMS, for example, requires consumers to pay half of the cost 
of hiring an arbitrator, renting a hearing room, and other expenses, 
which is inconsistent with JAMS consumer arbitration rules. 161 
Pinterest162 agrees to subsidize consumers, but only for “non-frivolous 
filings.”163 It is unclear who decides if a filing is frivolous.  
Fifty-six percent of the providers (N=33) note that they subsidize 
arbitration costs, while 24 percent suggest that the costs may be shared. 
Sixteen social media providers impose limited “loser pays” rules in some 
circumstances. One provider asserts that it has the discretion to pay 
arbitration fees if it loses. Another provider’s clause states that it will 
pay the consumer fees if the arbitrator awards more than the 
consumer’s demand in its complaint. Three providers assert that they 
will pay the arbitrator’s fees so long as the award is less than $10,000. 
Two other providers say they will pay the arbitrator’s fees only under 
some conditions. All of these reservations on payment violate the AAA 
Principle that costs be reasonable for the consumer.  
b. Ban on Class Actions Violates the Reasonable Cost Principle 
Class actions are often the running partner of consumer arbitration 
clauses as Figure 7 (below) illustrates.164 Seventy-six percent of the  
160. JAMS, supra note 41, at 2. 
161. Meetup, supra note 77.  
162. Pinterest, an entity founded in early 2010, provides online services 
through its website, www.pinterest.com. Pinterest’s web-based platform 
allows users to accumulate images and other content, which the user 
organizes into themed “boards.”  
163. Terms of Service, Pinterest, https://about.pinterest.com/en/terms-
service (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (“Pinterest will pay for your 
reasonable filing, administrative, and arbitrator fees if your claim for 
damages does not exceed $75,000 and is non-frivolous (as measured by 
the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)). The 
award rendered by the arbitrator shall include costs of arbitration, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs for expert and other 
witnesses, and any judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator 
may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
164. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate 
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable 
Abuse?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75, 75 (2004). 
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fifty-nine social media providers mandating arbitration also prohibit 
consumers from initiating or joining class actions (N=38). Flixster’s 
class action waiver clause is typical:  
The parties agree that they will resolve their disputes on an 
individual basis. Any claims brought under this agreement 
must be brought in the parties’ individual capacity, and not 
as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, 
collective, or representative proceeding. This agreement also 
prevents any party from participating in a class action 
(existing or future) that was brought by any other party. 
Instead, the parties agree to resolve their disputes under this 
agreement on an individual basis.165 
Figure Seven: Most Social Media Sites with Arbitration 
Clauses Also Prohibit Class Actions 
 
For small dollar claims, consumer class actions are the only 
practical means of recourse. If a social media user is prohibited from 
initiating or joining a class action, it is likely that no arbitrations will 
be filed because individual claims will seldom be greater than the 
expenses in pursuing arbitration, which may include filing fees, airfares, 
a hotel stay, and legal representation. Caps on damages, coupled with 
anti–class action waivers render legal rights moot because there is no 
meaningful remedy.166 Tagged.com forbids users from employing class 
 
165. Flixster Terms of Service, Flixster, https://www.flixster.com/docs/ 
terms/us/ (last updated Apr. 25, 2013).  
166. Our research on social media sites concludes that when capped damages, 
anti–class action waivers, and other limitations on the ability of damages 
are considered total consumer fees almost always exceed the total possible 
recovery. Cf. The Costs of Arbitration, Public Citizen, 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7173 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“The cost to a plaintiff of initiating an 
arbitration is almost always higher than the cost of instituting a lawsuit. 
Our comparison of court fees to the fees charged by the three primary 
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actions but reserves its right to consolidate claims if the website judges 
it beneficial: 
At any time and in its sole discretion Tagged may direct the 
AAA to consolidate any and all pending individual arbitration 
claims that (i) arise in substantial part from the same and/or 
related transactions, events and/or occurrences, and (ii) 
involve a common question of law and/or fact which, if 
resolved in multiple individual and non-consolidated arbitra-
tion proceedings, may result in conflicting and/or inconsistent 
results. In said event, you hereby consent to consolidated 
arbitration, in lieu of individual arbitration, of any and all 
claims you may have against tagged and the AAA rules set 
forth herein shall govern all parties.167 
Class actions against SNS are a real danger when these clauses are not 
included. Online injuries, such as privacy violations, often cause only 
small amounts of damage to each user but impact tens of millions of 
customers.168 In March 2013, the mobile social network provider Path, 
whose TOU did not contain a class action preclusion, was targeted by 
an Illinois class action, contending that Path violated the Telephone 
 
arbitration provider organizations demonstrates that forum costs—the costs 
charged by the tribunal that will decide the dispute—can be up to five 
thousand percent higher in arbitration than in court litigation. These costs 
have a deterrent effect, often preventing a claimant from even filing a 
case.”). But cf. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 100, at 891 (“Total 
arbitration fees (i.e., both administrative and arbitrator’s fees) ranged from 
0.0% of the amount claimed to 65.1% of the amount claimed. The outlier 
was a case in which the amount sought was less than $200. In no other case 
did the total arbitration costs exceed 25.0% of the amount claimed.”).  
167. Tagged, supra note 132.  
168. Social media providers face the greatest potential liability for the invasion 
of privacy and most actions are filed as class actions. See, e.g., Claridge v. 
RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (settling class action 
for failure of the site to secure user’s privacy and security); Cohen v. 
Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that 
Facebook users did not consent to the SNS using their names and likenesses 
to promote service and ruling that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim 
for appropriation of their names and likenesses for an advantage, but ruling 
that plaintiffs were unable to prove damages); In re Facebook Privacy 
Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing class action by 
Facebook users based upon the Electronic Communications Privacy Act as 
well as California state law); Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 
319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (filing class action against MySpace for alleged 
violation of the Stored Communications Act); In re Google Buzz Privacy 
Litigation, No. C 10–00672 JW., 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) 
(approving $8 million dollar settlement in class action brought by Gmail 
users arising out of Google’s disclosure of personally identifiable information 
without authorization through the defunct site, Google Buzz). 
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Consumer Protection Act169 by using automated services to transmit 
SMS messages without the recipient’s consent.170 The widespread use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses coupled with anti–class action waivers is 
a distinctively American market–based solution to reallocate the cost 
of wrongdoing.171 Only nine of the eighteen foreign SNS specifying class 
actions ban class actions.  
c. Loser Pays Provisions 
Ten of the fifty-nine SNS specifying either the AAA or JAMS as 
the arbitral provider require the consumer to either pay for motions to 
compel arbitration or SNS’ attorneys’ fee and costs if they do not 
prevail. JAMS Principle 8 provides that (under California law) “the 
arbitration provision may not require the consumer to pay the fees and 
costs incurred by the opposing party if the consumer does not 
prevail.”172 This is a significant failure because twenty-seven of the 
forty-nine clauses specified California as the exclusive arbitral forum 
(54%).173 Christian Mingle, which is located in Los Angeles, agrees to 
pay arbitration costs, exclusive of attorney’s fees, for non-frivolous 
cases,174 but imposes a “loser pays” rule where it can seek attorneys’ 
fees from consumer.175  
 
169. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012). 
170. Sterk v. Path, Inc., No. 13 C 2330, 2013 WL 5460813 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 
2013); Sarah Pierce, Path Mobile App Privacy Class Action Lawsuit, Top 
Class Actions (Mar. 29, 2012), http://topclassactions.com/ 
lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/1728-path-mobile-app-privacy-class-
action-lawsuit-/. 
171. Anti–class action waivers are routinely included into consumer arbitration 
agreements. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It 
Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 Ind. L.J. 
289, 300 (2012) (“A study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute of AAA 
consumer arbitrations found that every arbitration agreement involving 
cell phone services and credit cards prohibited class actions.”). 
172. JAMS, supra note 41, at 3. 
173. California state law prohibits agreements that require a nonprevailing 
consumer party to pay fees and costs incurred by the opposing party. 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1284.3 (West 2007). 
174. Christian Mingle, supra note 79 (“We will pay the amount of any 
arbitration costs and fees charged by the AAA for claims totaling less 
than $10,000 unless the arbitrator determines the claims are frivolous. In 
no event will We pay for Your attorneys’ fees unless required by law.”). 
175. Id. (“The prevailing party in any of the following matters (without regard 
to the Limitation of Liability provisions) shall be entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in any of the following 
circumstances: (i) a motion which any party is required to make in any 
court to compel arbitration of a Dispute; (ii) any appeal of an arbitration 
award, whether to the arbitrator or the courts, for the purpose of vacating 
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None of the SNS arbitral clauses gave consumers even a ballpark 
estimate of the cost of filing an arbitration request or information 
stating whether the deposits were refundable. No SNS gave consumers 
an estimate of the hourly rate of arbitrators. The reasonable cost 
principle also was not met because of the providers’ caps and limitations 
on warranties and damages.176  
6. AAA Principle 7: Reasonably Convenient Location  
The AAA requires that providers conduct in-person arbitration in 
a location reasonably convenient to the consumer, not just beneficial to 
the provider. AAA Principle 7 states the following: 
In the case of face-to-face proceedings, the proceedings should 
be conducted at a location which is reasonably convenient to 
both parties with due consideration of their ability to travel 
and other pertinent circumstances. If the parties are unable to 
agree on a location, the determination should be made by the 
Independent ADR Institution or by the Neutral.177 
Figure Eight (below) reveals that 48 percent of the arbitration clauses 
(N=28) specified that the arbitration be held in the social media’s home 
jurisdiction as opposed to the consumer’s home jurisdiction, which 
would make proceedings more affordable for the user.  
  
 
or modifying the award; or (iii) any action to enforce the confidentiality 
provisions stated herein.”). 
176. See, e.g., Terms of Use, 99designs, http://99designs.com/legal/terms-of-use 
(last updated Oct. 2013) (“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained herein, our (and our suppliers’) liability to you for any damages 
arising from or related to this Agreement (for any cause whatsoever and 
regardless of the form of the action), will at all times be limited to the greater 
of fifty us dollars ($50) or (b) amounts you have paid 99designs in the prior 
12 months (if any). The existence of more than one claim will not enlarge this 
limit.”). 
177. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59. 
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Figure Eight: Where Mandatory Arbitration Is Held 
 
 
Only nineteen out of the fifty-nine TOU specified the consumer’s 
home jurisdiction as the location where the arbitration is conducted 
(32%). Nine providers do not specify the location of the hearing (15%). 
In three clauses, nonappearance arbitration was specified, defined as a 
telephone hearing or decision purely on the documents that are 
submitted by the parties. Academic.edu contemplates arbitration 
hearings in the consumer’s home country, but for small dollar amounts, 
arbitration is based on the documents alone: “Unless you and 
Academia.edu otherwise agree, the arbitration will be conducted in the 
county where you reside. If your claim does not exceed $10,000, then 
the arbitration will be conducted solely on the basis of the documents 
that you and Academia.edu submit . . . .” 178  Several arbitration 
clauses in the larger sample specified distant, inconvenient forums. 
Mouthshut, a site located in India, has a TOU that states as follows: 
This Agreement is governed in all respects by the laws of 
Republic of India as such laws are applied to agreements 
entered into and to be performed entirely within India between 
Indian residents. Any controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this Agreement or the MouthShut.com site shall be 
settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the Indian 
Arbitration Act 1996. Any such controversy or claim shall be 
arbitrated on an individual basis, and shall not be consolidated 
in any arbitration with any claim or controversy of any other 
party. The arbitration shall be conducted in Mumbai, India 
and judgment on the arbitration award may be entered into 
any court having jurisdiction thereof.179 
 
178. Academia.edu, supra note 131. 
179. Terms of Services, Mouthshut.com, http://www.mouthshut.com/ 
help/tos.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
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Of course, a user in India would consider the requirement that they 
litigate half a world away in California to be equally onerous.  
7. AAA Principle 9: Right to Representation  
The AAA requires the provider to specify that “[a]ll parties 
participating in processes in ADR Programs have the right, at their 
own expense, to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choos-
ing.”180 In fifty-eight out of fifty-nine AAA and JAMS arbitral clauses 
drafted by SNS, there was no mention of the role of lawyers in 
arbitration, even though this violates a basic AAA principle. Only one 
provider discloses this fundamental right of being represented by an 
attorney at arbitration proceedings. This right of representation, 
however, is largely moot. No reasonable attorney will represent a social 
media user where the cost of filing and traveling to a distant forum far 
outweighs the possible recovery. 
8. AAA Principle 10: Mediation  
AAA Principle 10 states that “[t]he use of mediation is strongly 
encouraged as an informal means of assisting parties in resolving their 
own disputes.”181 Yet amongst the arbitration clauses surveyed, one out 
of the fifty-nine provided for a mediation option prior to arbitration. 
Many of the providers specified informal dispute resolution with the 
provider, but mediation by neutral or independent mediators was not 
offered. 
9. AAA Principle 11: Agreements to Arbitrate  
By incorporating predispute mandatory arbitration clauses into 
their TOU, a large and growing number of Internet websites are 
divesting users of their rights to civil recourse against providers who 
violate their privacy, commit torts, or infringe their intellectual 
property rights.182 SNS users around the world are required to agree to 
 
180. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59. 
181. Id. 
182. Civil wrongs committed on social media sites are difficult to litigate because 
of endemic problems such as the anonymous poster, the distant forum, the 
problem of finding representation, and arbitral clauses. Given that there are 
billions of social media sites, lawsuits are rare despite the huge potential for 
intentional torts, infringement, and employment-related disputes. E.g., 
E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ill. 2012) 
(enforcing the forum selection clause in Facebook’s Terms of Service); 
Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (settling 
class action for failure of the site to secure user’s privacy and security); 
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding 
that Facebook users did not consent to the SNS using their names and 
likenesses to promote service and ruling that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated 
a claim for appropriation of their names and likenesses for an advantage 
but ruling that plaintiffs were unable to prove damages); In re Facebook 
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predispute mandatory arbitration as a condition of visiting SNS.183 
Seventy-one percent of SNS did not explain arbitration, thus violating 
both AAA and JAMS principles. Seven of the fifty-nine (12%) arbitral 
clauses provided the user with any information about how to submit 
their claim to arbitration. Eighty-six percent (51 of 59) of the arbitra-
tion clauses provided no information on how to initiate arbitration. 
Only ten (17%) providers mentioned that consumers agreeing to 
arbitration have restricted rights to an appeal in the event of an adverse 
decision by the arbitrator. Only 14 percent of social media TOU 
disclosed that consumers agreeing to arbitration also were waiving their 
right to court-supervised discovery. No SNS disclosed that private 
arbitrators have no subpoena power (8 of 59). Only 31 percent (18 of 
59) mentioned that the user was waiving access to courts. 
10. AAA Principle 12: Arbitration Hearings  
None of the SNS arbitration clauses attempted to explain how ADR 
hearings worked despite AAA Principle 12, which holds that parties 
“are entitled to a fundamentally-fair arbitration hearing.” 184  “This 
requires adequate notice of hearings and an opportunity to be heard 
and to present relevant evidence to impartial decision-makers.”185 The 
requirements of a fair arbitration hearing, according to the AAA’s rules, 
“may be met by hearings conducted by electronic or telephonic means 
or by a submission of documents.” 186  Only six out of fifty-nine 
 
Privacy Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing class 
action by Facebook users based upon the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act as well as California state law); Hubbard v. MySpace, Inc., 788 
F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (filing class action against MySpace for 
alleged violation of the Stored Communications Act); In re Google Buzz 
Privacy Litigation, No. C 10–00672 JW., 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. June 
2, 2011) (approving $8 million settlement in class action brought by Gmail 
users arising out of Google’s disclosure of personally identifiable information 
without authorization through the defunct site, Google Buzz). 
183. The first research study of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in 
SNS studied a sample broadly representative of the universe of social 
media in 2012. Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 649 (“Generalist sites, such 
as Facebook and MyLife, target connections between friends, family, and 
acquaintances. In contrast, niche sites include those designed for 
educational, career, or professional development such as LinkedIn. Sites 
that enable meetings in major cities for shared interest groups are included 
in the sample. Social media websites targeting specific age, racial, cultural, 
or status-oriented groups are also part of the SNS sample. Sites appealing 
to rating, dating, mating, and sexual fetishism are included in the sample, 
as are sites dedicated to entertainment (anime, video sharing, book 
reviews, and movies) and highlighting talent.”). 
184. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
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arbitration clauses (10%) offered nonappearance arbitration. Even in 
these cases, the ADR provider did not offer a face-to-face hearing, which 
is inconsistent with the principle that this option be made available.187 
In two other cases (3%), nonappearance arbitration options were 
available, but the plaintiff had the option to pursue an in-person 
hearing. Requiring a consumer to travel to a distant forum for a small 
dollar claim is unreasonable. 
11. AAA Principle 13: Access to Information  
AAA Principle 13 provides that parties have a right to discovery.188 
It states that “[n]o party should ever be denied the right to a 
fundamentally-fair process due to an inability to obtain information 
material to a dispute.”189 The AAA provides that “[c]onsumer ADR 
agreements which provide for binding arbitration should establish 
procedures for arbitrator-supervised exchange of information prior to 
arbitration, bearing in mind the expedited nature of arbitration.”190 
Only eight of the fifty-nine (14%) arbitral clauses mentioned the word 
“discovery.” Overwhelmingly, arbitration clauses do not address this 
important due process right. Only three of the fifty-nine AAA and 
JAMS clauses described a procedure for exchanging information. SNS 
made no effort to disclose to their customers that by agreeing to 
arbitration that they were foreclosing rights fundamental to court 
proceedings. 
12. AAA Principle 14: Full Remedies in Arbitration  
AAA Principle 14 requires that providers give arbitrators the power 
“to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in 
equity.”191 Fifty-eight of the fifty-nine SNS violate AAA Consumer Due 
Process Protocol in not allowing arbitrators to award the full range of 
remedies available in U.S. courts. Fifty-eight out of fifty-nine providers 
disclaimed all UCC performance warranties in their TOU. All of the 
providers precluded the arbitrator from awarding damages for express 
warranties, the implied warranty of merchantability, and any other 
U.C.C. Article 2 warranty. The consistent pattern in our sample is that 
 
187. Id. (“[T]he Neutral should have discretionary authority to require a face-
to-face hearing upon the request of a party.”). 
188. Arbitral providers will sometimes permit general discovery, but this 
requires an application to an arbitrator and is subject to the discretion of 
the arbitrator. See Marrow, supra note 65, at 44–46. JAMS, for example, 
permits depositions and discovery at the arbitrator’s discretion, which is 
similar to the rule for the AAA. Id. 
189. Consumer Due Process, supra note 59. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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social media providers are engaged in a systematic rights and remedies 
foreclosure scheme.  
The social media providers generally included clauses that 
eliminated consequential damages, special damages, punitive damages, 
and many other categories of damages. The remedy of punitive damages 
incentivizes private attorneys general192 to uncover fraudulent or decep-
tive practices, thus supplementing public enforcement.193 “Private tort 
litigants serve the public interest by uncovering dangerous products 
and practices.”194 Empowering private citizens and their attorneys as 
private attorneys general reflects a legislative intent to augment or 
enlarge consumer protection.195 Punitive damages often have a greater 
deterrent effect than the relatively slight civil penalties imposed by 
 
192. The legal realist Jerome Frank, a Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
jurist, coined the term “private attorneys general.” He used the term 
“private attorney general” to refer to “any person, official or not,” who 
brought a proceeding, “even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public 
interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney 
Generals.” Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 
(2d Cir. 1943). The private attorney general is a “powerful engine of public 
policy.” Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 
61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 179, 179 (1998). Examples of the private 
attorney general role include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012), 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012), and the Robinson-Patman Anti-
Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b (2012). See Thomas Koenig & 
Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. Mich. J. L. 
Reform 289, 306 n.75 (1998) (noting that “[d]ual governmental and private 
enforcement” is provided for in the statute provisions stated herein when 
explaining role of punitive damages and statutory damages in evidencing 
the role of private enforcement for a public purpose). 
193. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1359 (Me. 1985) (“Flexibility is also 
necessary to avoid situations where the potential benefits of wrongdoing 
could outweigh a known maximum liability.”); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 
684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) (“If punitive damages are predictably 
certain, they become just another item in the cost of doing business, much 
like other production costs, and thereby induce a reluctance on the part of 
the manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctible defect.”). 
194. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, In Defense of Tort 
Law 2 (2001). 
195. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 
1986) (“[P]unitive damages reward individuals who serve as ‘private 
attorneys general’ in bringing wrongdoers to account.”). See also 
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 553–54 (N.J. 
1997) (explaining the private attorney general role in consumer cases). Cf. 
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) 
(“Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ 
on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are 
deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective . . . is 
the carrot of treble damages.”). 
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federal regulators.196 The valuable institution of the private attorney 
general is undermined by TOU that eliminate the possibility of punitive 
damages.  
Social media providers violate the consumer due process protocols 
for both arbitral providers when they place extreme limitations on what 
remedies the arbitrator may award.197 One hundred percent of the 
nineteen arbitration clauses choosing JAMS as the provider capped 
damages at a nominal amount. Three out of four JAMS arbitration 
clauses limited damages to ten dollars or less.198 The JAMS clauses 
overreach in making the total dollar recovery 1/25 of the initial 
arbitration fee. Second Life’s exclusion of direct, indirect, economic, 
exemplary, incidental, consequential, reliance, special, or punitive losses 
or damages as well as all equitable remedies, for example, is not in 
accord with AAA principles.199 Second Life also violates the due process 
principle in restricting the dollar amount of damages that an arbitrator 
may award.200 Many of the SNS eliminate remedies, such as Spotify’s 
clause that precludes awarding “declaratory or injunctive relief.”201  
 Statutes of limitations curtail the period in which claims can be 
asserted against providers. The Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act (UCITA), for example, adopts a complicated statute of 
limitations that combines a discovery rule with a rule of repose. 
Section 805 imposes the later of a four-year statute of limitations from 
the time the cause of action accrues or “one year after the breach was 
 
196. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive 
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1269, 1325 n.282 (1993) (“The total of all CPSC fines in its history is the 
functional equivalent of a parking ticket for a Fortune 500 firm. Statutory 
penalties are too insignificant to be noticed.”).  
197. See Consumer Due Process, supra note 59(“The arbitrator should be 
empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law 
or in equity.”); JAMS, supra note 41, at 2 (“Remedies that would 
otherwise be available to the consumer under applicable federal, state or 
local laws must remain available under the arbitration clause.”). 
198. Every social media choosing JAMS as a provider (19 of 19) disclaimed all 
warranties in their TOU. All nineteen clauses require the consumer to 
indemnify the social media should third parties file suit against them for 
their postings, comments, or pictures. 
199. Linden Lab, supra note 79. 
200. Id. (“EXCEPT AS MAY BE PROVIDED IN ANY ADDITIONAL 
TERMS, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLIC-
ABLE LAW, IN NO EVENT WILL LINDEN LAB’S CUMULATIVE 
LIABILITY TO YOU EXCEED THE GREATER OF (i) ONE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS (U.S. $100.00); OR (ii) THE FEES, IF ANY, 
PAID BY YOU FOR USE OF THE SERVICE . . . .”).  
201. Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use, Spotify, https://www.spotify.com/ 
us/legal/end-user-agreement/#s19 (last updated Mar. 5, 2014). 
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or should have been discovered, but not later than five years after the 
right of action accrues.”202  
The absolute limit to file an action is “five years after the right of 
action accrues.”203 Third-party warranty claims are subject to different 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.204 The parties may agree 
to reduce the period of limitation but not for less than a year after the 
cause of action accrues, except in consumer contracts where this 
limitation may not be reduced.205 The social media providers in our 
sample reduced the statute of limitations to the outer limits of what is 
permitted under UCITA, and a few providers went even further. 
Twenty-two of the fifty-nine social media providers (37%) reduced the 
statute of limitations, with fourteen specifying a period of one year or 
less. 206  Two social media providers trimmed down the statute of 
limitations to a diminished period ranging from only thirty days to a 
year, thus reducing the period in which plaintiffs may assert claims. 
Only four providers that slashed the statute of limitations allowed 
claims to be filed for a period greater than a year. Meetup’s terms and 
conditions states that “[y]ou and Meetup each agree that regardless of 
any statute or law to the contrary, any claim or cause of action arising 
out of or related to the use of our Platform or this Agreement must be 
filed within one (1) year after the claim or cause of action arose or be 
forever barred.”207  
In the U.S. legal system, tort statutes of limitations are set by state 
statute at periods of two to four years.208 In the absence of this reduced 
statute of limitations provision, courts would have the power to award 
damages or enter equitable remedies for cases filed during a longer 
period in accord with the state’s statute of limitations. These measures 
demonstrate unequivocally that social media providers are not giving  
202. Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act § 805(a) (2002). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. § 805(d). 
205. Id. § 805(b). 
206. See, e.g., Pheed, supra note 58 note 58 (“YOU AGREE THAT ANY 
CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THESE 
TERMS OR THE SERVICE MUST COMMENCE WITHIN ONE (1) 
YEAR AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES. OTHERWISE, 
SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION IS PERMANENTLY BARRED.”). 
207. Meetup, supra note 77.. 
208. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-2-38 (West 2005) (setting statute of limitations 
for injury claims at two years); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1, 338 (West 
2006) (noting that tort personal injury claims are set at two years and 
property damage claims at three years); D.C. Code § 12-301 (2001) 
(setting statute of limitations for property damages claims at three years); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (West 2002) (setting property and personal 
injury statute of limitations at four years); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
260, § 2A (West 2004) (establishing statute of limitations for personal 
injury and property damages at three years). 
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consumers the same remedies available in court. Consumers are clearly 
locked into a rigged system, where their rights are systematically 
foreclosed and their remedies cannibalized by TOU, which are contracts 
of adhesion. 
13. What We Still Don’t Know About Fundamental Fairness 
Our findings support the proposition that SNS are drafting clauses 
that violate many consumer due process principles promulgated by the 
AAA and JAMS. Our study, however, cannot examine whether JAMS 
or the AAA effectively reviews arbitration clauses for protocol 
compliance, because there are only four arbitral filings against the social 
media providers in our sample. Data are unknown and likely 
unknowable regarding whether arbitration was independent, impartial, 
and independently administered, which is Principle 3 of AAA Consumer 
Due Process Protocol. Losers in both arbitration and the courts, of 
course, frequently perceive the process as unfair. Nor do we have data 
on whether arbitrators are competent (Principle 4). Neither the AAA 
nor JAMS publishes systematic data on the record of accomplishment 
of arbitrators conducting consumer arbitrations, although the catalog 
of qualifications necessary to become an AAA arbiter appears impos-
ing.209  
Our content analysis demonstrates that social media providers are 
systematically ignoring AAA and JAMS consumer due process proto-
cols in drafting top-heavy arbitration clauses favoring the dominant 
party.210 This one-sided boilerplate, like mandatory arbitration clauses 
in credit card loans should not be enforceable.211 A number of decisions 
by the U.S. Supreme Court over the past decade, however, have 
emboldened companies to draft extremely imbalanced TOU. 
 
209. Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of 
Arbitrators, Am. Arb. Ass’n 1, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF? 
doc=ADRSTG_003878 (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
210. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration 
Provisions, 8 Nev. L.J. 37, 50–51 (2007) (“Furthermore, companies have 
ignored the Protocol’s ‘shoulds,’ and arbitral institutions have little power 
or incentive to impose consumer-friendly procedures or otherwise regulate 
companies’ arbitral programs. Administering institutions have been under 
fire for favoring repeat-player companies and promulgating permissive rules 
that generally allow for companies’ manipulation to their disproportionate 
advantage.”). 
211. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study Preliminary 
Results Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date 19–20 (2013) 
(“CFPB Study”) (noting that the Ross v. Bank of America, No. 05 Civ. 
7116 settlement removed mandatory arbitration for 43 percent of credit 
card loans outstanding as of 2012). 
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G. Explaining Why U.S. Social Media Draft Such Aggressive Clauses  
The only prior empirical research on arbitration clauses, a 2007 
study, found that greater than three out of four consumer arbitration 
clauses fully complied with the AAA’s Consumer Due Process 
Protocol.212 In contrast, our research on consumer arbitration clauses 
conducted in 2014 found the opposite. Social media providers violated 
consumer due process protocols in nearly every respect.213  
One possible explanation for the differences is that the Court has 
sent a series of strong signals over the past decade that there are no 
legal limits to pursuing self-advantage through one-sided clauses. 
Neither courts nor consumer regulators appear to be protecting 
consumers from draconian TOU, such as MouthShut’s clause requireing 
consumers to appear before arbitrators in Mumbai. “Instead, the 
Supreme Court itself is leading the revolutionary transition from litiga-
tion to mandatory binding private arbitration, proclaiming ‘federal 
policy favors arbitration, over litigation.’”214 Secure in the knowledge 
that one-sided provisions will be enforced in America, U.S. websites 
appear to be responding to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence by 
drafting imbalanced arbitration clauses.  
H. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Preoccupation 
with Predispute Arbitration 
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 in large part 
to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration in the early twentyeth 
century by “plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as 
other contracts.”215 Since the late 1990s, the Supreme Court has decided 
three times more arbitration cases than punitive damages due process 
cases, repeatedly validating mandatory arbitration in consumer, 
employment, and business transactions.216 An incredible twenty-four 
 
212. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 23, at 341 (“In the case file sample of 
AAA consumer arbitrations, the majority of consumer arbitration clauses 
(229 of 299, or 76.6%) fully complied with the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol as applied by the AAA.”). 
213. Id. at 341–42 (noting in the only prior empirical study, “the AAA refused 
to administer at least 85 consumer cases, and likely at least 129 consumer 
cases (or 9.4% of its total consumer caseload), because the business failed 
to comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol. The most common 
reason for refusing to administer a case (55 of 129 cases, or 42.6%) was 
the business’s failure to pay its share of the costs of arbitration rather 
than any problematic provision in the arbitration clause.”). 
214. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 638 
(1996).  
215. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
216. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–
04 (2012) (holding per curiam that “West Virginia’s prohibition against 
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Court rulings have radically expanded the reach of arbitration clauses 
since 1998. 217  Two of these twenty-four “Supreme Court opinions, 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson and Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, ‘creat[ed] a sea change in the way that consumer arbitration 
would be viewed.’” 218  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas rule consistently “in favor of rigorously enforcing 
arbitration agreements and tend to construe arbitration provisions in 
such a way as to render them enforceable.”219 The Supreme Court’s 
consumer arbitration jurisprudence implicitly accepts the corporate 
wrongdoers’ mantra that redistributionist juries are out of control. 
Bypassing the court system by employing private proceedings 
conducted by arbitrators is championed in the name of efficiency and 
freedom of contract.220 
I. Role of U.S. Supreme Court in Abridging Class Action 
In a class action, one or more people, called class representatives, 
sue on behalf of people who have similar claims. All these people are 
members of the class, except for those who exclude themselves from the 
class. The class action provides the keys to the courthouse when 
individual damages are capped because the aggregation of small dollar 
claims makes it cost-effective to seek a collective remedy for 
substantially similar claims.221   
predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims 
against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a 
particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage 
of the FAA.”); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 
(2012) (holding in part that consumer claims arising under the Credit 
Repair Organizations Act (CROA) are subject to mandatory arbitration 
because Congress was silent on whether these claims were arbitratable).  
217. Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 679–80, 684–88 (depicting cases and holdings 
for twenty-four U.S. Supreme Court cases decided between 1998 and 2012). 
218. Yvette Ostolaza, Overview of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Financial 
Services Contracts, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 37, 38 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
219. Adam Borstein, Arbitrary Enforcement: When Arbitration Agreements 
Contain Unlawful Provisions, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1259, 1294 (2006). 
220. Kiera S. Gans and Davide Rossetti, US Supreme Court Upholds Freedom-
of-Contract Principle in Antitrust Class Arbitration, Lawyer (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://www.thelawyer.com/briefings/us-supreme-court-upholds-
freedom-of-contract-principle-in-antitrust-class-arbitration/3010172.article 
(“In the recent case of American Express co et al v Italian Colors 
Restaurant et al, the US Supreme Court addressed the validity of a 
contractual waiver to class arbitration where the cost of individually 
arbitrating a federal statutory antitrust claim made it cost-prohibitive 
to raise those claims independently rather than as part of a collective class. 
The court’s conclusion in favour of upholding the agreement can be seen as 
a further re-affirmation of the principles of freedom of contract.”). 
221. See generally Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action 
Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial 
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The class action, when not prohibited by the TOU, enables social 
media users to seek remedies for widespread damages such as breaches 
of their privacy. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.222 was a class action settle-
ment resulting from users’ claims that the social media giant 
misappropriated their users’ names and likenesses in advertisements 
called “Sponsored Stories.” 223 The plaintiffs alleged that their names 
and profile pictures were presented as promoting products and services 
because they clicked on Facebook’s “like” button. The court approved 
a twenty million dollar settlement fund, and Facebook also agreed “to 
make changes to the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” and “to 
implement additional mechanisms giving users greater information 
about, and control over, how their names and likenesses are employed 
in connection with Sponsored Stories.”224 “The settlement fund is to be 
distributed in cash payments of $15 each to Facebook members who 
submitted valid claims.”225  
Lane v. Facebook, Inc.226 was a class action lawsuit filed by users 
against Facebook’s 2007 program entitled Beacon that resulted in 
private information being posted on Facebook without users’ consent.227 
Facebook ended up terminating the Beacon program and created a $9.5 
million fund for privacy and security. The settlement did not result in 
any monetary award to Facebook users who had been allegedly harmed 
by Beacon.228 These cases are prototypical examples of litigation that 
would not be cost-justified without the ability to join into a class of 
victims. Table Four (below) documents that the typical social media 
class action involves small dollar amounts by numerous users. 
  
 
Standard, 45 Hous. L. Rev. 215, 223 (2008) (discussing arguments for and 
against upholding class action waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses). 
222. No. C 11-1726 RS, 2013 WL 4516806 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013). 
223. Id. at *1. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012). 
227. Id. at 816. 
228. Id. at 816–17. 
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Table Four: Class Actions Filed by Social Media Users (2011–2014) 
Name of Case and 
Citation
Basis for Claim 
In re Zynga Privacy 
Litig., 750 F.3d 1098 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
Plaintiffs contended that Zynga’s header 
information, which included a social network 
user’s unique ID and the address of the 
webpage from which the user’s request to 
view another webpage violated the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act’s (ECPA) and 
the Stored Communications Act. The appeals 
court affirmed dismissal of case.
C.M.D. v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. C 12–1216 
RS, 2014 WL 1266291 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 
2014). 
Practices by which Facebook utilizes the 
names and profile pictures of its users in ways 
that arguably constitute advertising for 
various third parties. The putative plaintiff 
class in this action is composed solely of 
minors.
Fraley v. Facebook, 
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 
939 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
Class action against Facebook alleging 
misappropriation of names and/or likenesses 
to promote products and services. Final 
settlement class approved; Facebook agreed to 
make certain changes to the Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities (“SRRs”). The 
agreement also contemplates Facebook 
making a cy pres payment of several million 
dollars to certain organizations involved in 
Internet privacy issues, and provides that 
plaintiffs may apply for attorneys’ fees.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 
696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
Settlement agreement in class action brought 
by members against Facebook and 
participants in network program that had 
updated members’ network personal profiles 
to reflect actions taken by members on 
participants’ websites. Approved settlement’s 
cy pres funds to fund and sponsor programs 
to educate users and others regarding online 
privacy issues.  
Leong v. MySpace, 
Inc., No. CV 10–8366 
AHM (Ex)., 2011 WL 
7808208 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2011).
Plaintiffs alleged intentional and knowing 
transmission of data about MySpace users to 
outside advertising companies. Court ordered 
transfer enforcing MySpace’s choice of forum 
clause.
In re LinkedIn User 
Privacy Litig., 932 F. 
Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013). 
Plaintiffs contented “that networking website 
failed to adequately protect user information”; 
defendant’s motion to dismiss granted. 
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Rodriguez v. 
Instagram, L.L.C., No. 
C 12–06482 WHA, 
2013 WL 3732883 
(N.D. Cal. July 15, 
2013). 
Courts dismissed putative class action based 
upon breach of contract arising from 
Instagram’s unilateral modification of its 
TOU that included a predispute mandatory 
arbitration clause. 
 
Neither the AAA nor JAMS address the issue of whether providers 
can include an anti–class action waiver in their arbitration clauses. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
does not permit a court to invalidate a contractual waiver of class 
arbitration, even if the possible recovery has been capped below the 
minimum costs of pursuing the dispute.229 Anti–class action waivers, in 
effect, shield the SNS from any liability for torts such as inadequate 
security or the invasion of privacy or for breach of the service 
agreement. 230  These aggressive TOU have been encouraged by the 
Supreme Court’s series of anti-consumer decisions that uphold one-
sided, coercive predispute “agreements.” With these rulings, the Court 
is validating a coercive contracting environment where plaintiffs are 
shunted off to a private, secret arbitration proceeding, where they are 
forbidden to join similarly aggrieved consumers in an effort to hold SNS 
accountable.  
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court,231 a California state court held 
that class action waivers in a limited class of consumer contracts of 
adhesion were per se unconscionable in settings involving a scheme to 
defraud large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.232  The U.S. Supreme Court overruled Discover Bank in AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion.233 The Court’s conclusion was that class 
arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Association and 
“lacks its benefits.”234 The Court observed that imposing class actions 
on arbitration proceedings clashed with the FAA’s policy of enforcing 
 
229. See, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
230. F. Paul Bland Jr. & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 369, 380 
(2009) (“In cases involving fraud, misleading statements, or complex 
corporate practices, absent class members are unlikely to discover the factual 
basis for their claims without the assistance of a class action. This contributes 
to the exculpatory nature of many corporate class action bans.”). 
231. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
232. Id. at 1110. 
233. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
234. Id. at 1753. 
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arbitration agreements according to their terms.235 This is a federal 
takeover of California’s efforts to allow class actions in arbitration so 
that small claims may be pursued.236 After Concepcion, state courts are 
not free to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements with anti–class 
action waivers. 237 The U.S. Supreme Court’s validation of forced 
arbitration, even when combined with anti–class action waivers, 
accounts for why social media providers are so confident that their one-
sided TOU will be enforced by courts. The Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence has created, in effect, a federal immunity against lawsuits 
filed against social media providers.238  
In the 2013 case of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant,239 the U.S. Supreme Court went even further, holding that 
the FAA preempts state law even where there is no other effective way 
to vindicate federal rights.240 The plaintiff in that case was a small 
business, which proved that the cost of pursuing their antitrust claims 
would far exceed the maximum possible recovery in the absence of a 
way to aggregate claims with other affected businesses.241 Nevertheless, 
the Court ruled that the restaurant was bound by its predispute 
agreement that mandated individual arbitration, because the policies 
underlying the federal antitrust laws and class action rules did not 
override the FAA’s requirement that arbitration agreements be 
enforced.242  
The American Express Court noted that Concepcion “specifically 
rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute 
claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”243 The 
Court reasoned that the “FAA does . . . favor the absence of litigation 
 
235. Id. at 1750–53. 
236.  See Edward P. Boyle & David N. Cinotti, Beyond Nondiscrimination: 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the Further Federalization of 
U.S. Arbitration Law, 12 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 373 (2012). 
237. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–48 (2011). 
238. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: 
Reforming Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (demonstrating that it was rare for the hundreds 
of millions of users of publicly traded social networks to file consumer 
arbitrations arising out of TOU).  
239. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
“does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class 
arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually 
arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”). 
240. Id. at 2309–12. 
241. Id. at 2308. 
242. Id. at 2309–10. 
243. Id. at 2312 (citation omitted). 
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when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver . . . .”244 Under 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, if the arbitration 
agreement provides the right to pursue the claim, then the arbitration 
agreement should be enforced even if the cost of consumer arbitration 
exceeds what is at stake.245 The Court concluded that “the fact that it 
is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does 
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”246 In 
her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan argued that the class action 
waiver “prevent[ed] the effective vindication of federal statutory 
rights.”247 In reality, the Court precludes access to the arbitration forum 
altogether when the costs of pursuing the remedy exceed the largest 
possible award. 
Class action waivers preclude Internet users from filing a class 
action or even joining an existing one.248 This de facto immunity shields 
SNS from class actions for violations of privacy, contract, tort, or 
intellectual property rights that would otherwise be recognized in 
federal and state courts. In these opinions, the Court is going far beyond 
placing “arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other 
contracts.”249 
The Supreme Court’s legitimation of hard-line arbitral clauses that 
contain anti–class action waivers, coupled with predispute mandatory 
arbitration, largely precludes the possibility of redress for small dollar 
claims such as violations of the Stored Communications Act, Electronic 
 
244. Id. at 2312 n.5; Id. at 2309 (The Supreme Court ruled that “arbitration 
is a matter of contract” and consistent with the text of the FAA, “courts 
must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms” 
(citation omitted)). 
245. Id. at 2309–12. 
246. Id. at 2311; cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 
(2000) (stating that where “a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of 
incurring such costs”). 
247. 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
248. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld anti–class action waivers in AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
249. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. See generally 
Schmitz, supra note 210, at 40 (“Most consumer arbitration agreements 
are ‘boilerplate,’ pre-printed form contract clauses. Furthermore, ‘repeat 
player’ retailers and manufacturers routinely include these arbitration 
clauses in their non-negotiable form contracts, allowing these players to 
dictate the rules individuals must follow in asserting their claims. This 
may be problematic when repeat players use arbitration as means for 
curbing consumer remedies and preventing class actions. In addition, it 
allows them to shield the public from information regarding their wrongs 
and essentially to privatize justice.”). 
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Communications Privacy Act, promissory fraud, breach of contract, or 
the invasion of privacy because the cost of arbitration exceeds the 
potential recovery. SNS that combine mandatory arbitration with anti–
class action waivers ensure that these powerful entities will not be 
accountable for failing to secure and safeguard their users’ sensitive 
personally identifiable information. SNS can use the names, likenesses, 
and personal information of their users with impunity.250  
User privacy, right of publicity, or other torts have largely become 
rights without any realistic remedy because of the Court’s vindication 
of these bold TOU. Following the Court’s lead, lower courts are 
predisposed to enforce mandatory arbitration provisions even in the 
consumer software context.251 In In re Online Travel Co., for example, 
a Texas federal court upheld a predispute mandatory arbitration TOU 
clause, finding that the website users manifested their assent to the 
arbitration provisions and class arbitration waiver by accessing the 
website, thereby creating enforceable contracts.252  
J. Are There Any Limits to Unbalanced TOU? 
The Court’s methodical legitimation of consumer arbitration has 
emboldened websites to incorporate other unfair clauses into their 
TOU. KlearGear.com, a computer products cataloger and e-commerce 
retailer, like many Internet companies, disclaims all warranties in its 
TOU boilerplate.253 What sets KlearGear.com apart in being a poster 
child for aggressive terms is its previously included “Non-Disparage-
ment Clause,” which stated the following: 
In an effort to ensure fair and honest public feedback, and to 
prevent the publishing of libelous content in any form, your 
acceptance of this sales contract prohibits you from taking any 
action that negatively impacts KlearGear.com, its reputation, 
products, services, management or employees. 
 
250. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and 
Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931 (1999) 
(describing unfair consumer arbitration). 
251. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (App. Div. 1998) 
(ruling that buyer assented to arbitration clause shipped inside box with 
computer and software by retaining items beyond date specified by license 
terms). See also Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 
532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause 
where subscribers to online software were required to review license terms 
in scrollable window and to click “I Agree” or “I Don’t Agree”); Lieschke 
v. RealNetworks, Inc., No. 99 C 7274, 99 C 7380, 2000 WL 198424 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 11, 2000) (upholding end-user license agreement). 
252. 953 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2013). 
253. Terms of Sale and Use, and Policies, KlearGear.com, http://www. 
kleargear.com/help.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
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Should you violate this clause, as determined by KlearGear. 
com in its sole discretion, you will be provided a seventy-two 
(72) hour opportunity to retract the content in question. If the 
content remains, in whole or in part, you will immediately be 
billed $3,500.00 USD for legal fees and court costs until such 
complete costs are determined in litigation. Should these 
charges remain unpaid for 30 calendar days from the billing 
date, your unpaid invoice will be forwarded to our third party 
collection firm and will be reported to consumer credit 
reporting agencies until paid.254 
KlearGear’s non-disparagement clause is not conspicuous, not even “on 
the page that comes up when you click ‘Terms of Use,’ nor is it on the 
page that is directly linked from the checkout page. Instead, those links 
take you to a ‘help’ page that looks a lot like a Terms of Use page.”255 
Further “[w]ithin that page, there is buried a link to an actual Terms 
of Sale page that contains the clause in question.”256 When a dissatisfied 
consumer complained in an online posting that Kleargear had not sent 
the items she had ordered, the company charged a $3,500 penalty and 
ruined the consumer’s credit score by reporting this amount to credit 
rating agencies as an unpaid debt.257 A New York guesthouse’s TOU 
threatens to impose a $500 fine if guests post disparaging comments on 
social networking websites such as Yelp.258 The enforceability of such 
aggressive clauses is not yet clear. 
At present, U.S. consumers have little or no meaningful protection 
against one-sided boilerplate because of the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence. In effect, American consumers wave good-bye to any meaningful 
right or remedy when they click “yes” to manifest assent to a terms of 
use or even enter a website whose TOU contains a browsewrap 
 
254. Ken White, New from KlearGear: Free Speech, Only $3,500 Plus Shipping 
and Handling, Popehat (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.popehat. 
com/2013/11/15/new-from-kleargear-free-speech-only-3500-plus-shipping 
-and-handling/ (noting that the current TOU do not include the non-
disparagement clause). 
255. Chris Morran, KlearGear Defends $3,500 Non-Disparagement Fee, Says 
Court Ruling Doesn’t Count, Consumerist (May 20, 2014), http://con 
sumerist.com/2014/05/20/kleargear-defends-3500-non-disparagement-fee 
-says-court-order-doesnt-count/. 
256. Id. 
257. Chris Morran, Court Rules Company Can’t Collect $3,500 “Non-
Disparagement” Fee for Negative Online Review, Consumerist (May 15, 
2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/05/15/court-rules-company-can 
t-collect-3500-non-disparagement-fee-for-negative-online-review/.  
258. Caroline Moss, Hotel Fines Brides $500 for Every Negative Yelp Review 
Their Wedding Guests Leave, Business Insider (Aug. 4, 2014, 8:43 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/hotel-fines-brides-for-negative-yel 
p-reviews-2014-8#ixzz3A6mOOdVK. 
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provision. Consumer rights and remedies are subject only to “the grab 
law,” where providers protect their rights to the maximum while 
grabbing all rights and remedies from consumers. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has given U.S. companies the green light 
that they may continue to expand “form contracts, envelope stuffers, 
and Web sites to require their consumers, patients, students, and 
employees to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration, rather 
than in court.” 259  In the United States, predispute mandatory 
arbitration has become the most accepted and favored method of resol-
ving disputes.260 Cases like Kleargear will define how far the courts are 
willing to go in enforcing one-sided arbitration clauses.  
Conclusion  
Our empirical research on SNS arbitral clauses demonstrates that 
providers systematically foreclose consumer rights, violating the major-
ity of the AAA’s and JAMS’s minimum consumer due process stand-
ards. SNS fail nearly every test of consumer due process fundamental 
fairness by creating a one-sided legal universe where users have no 
meaningful rights because they lack any practical way of obtaining a 
remedy. Arbitration clauses are the classic illustration of a private 
justice system where SNS can sidestep the possibility of punitive 
damages, jury verdicts, class actions, and consequential damages. Tort 
law is being subsumed by this radical extension of contract law. 
SNS have created an ADR procedure that is fundamentally unfair, 
secure in the knowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court is willing to 
enforce consumer arbitration even when the imbalanced terms do not 
enable plaintiffs to vindicate small-dollar claims. Nearly all SNS 
mandating consumer arbitration draft their rights-foreclosure clauses to 
systematically divest their users of any practical remedy for all possible  
259. Sternlight, supra note 19, at 1631. 
260. The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence freely enforces arbitration 
agreements in consumer transactions. The Court has continued to hand 
down decisions enforcing FAA preemption against various forms of 
challenges. In addition to the Marmet case, these decisions include 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (reversing 
denial of motion to compel arbitration of claims for violation of a federal 
credit repair statute, because the law does require claims to proceed in 
court, and reaffirming that the FAA “requires courts to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate according to their terms”); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 
132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (reversing lower court’s refusal to compel 
arbitration of arbitral claims on grounds that non-arbitrable claims also 
existed, and holding that the FAA “requires courts to enforce the bargain 
of the parties to arbitrate” (citation omitted)); Huff v. Liberty League 
Int’l, L.L.C., No. EDCV 08–1010–VAP (SSx), 2009 WL 1033788, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2009) (granting motion to compel arbitration; “courts 
across the country have enforced so-called ‘clicking agreements’ that 
contain arbitration clauses”). 
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causes of action.261 Compulsory arbitration channels consumers into 
nonpublic proceedings decided by private judges who operate outside 
the state or federal court systems. Arbitrators are the ultimate umpires 
in a system of secret proceedings where there is no right of replay or 
appeal. Without standardized rules of evidence or court-supervised 
discovery, the consumer is at a huge disadvantage against repeat 
players.  
The corporate defendant chooses the arbitral provider, appoints 
and pays for the arbitrator, and establishes the rules of the game.262 
The arbitrator has a perverse incentive to rule in favor of the SNS 
because the SNS pays his salary. Arbitrators who rule against repeat 
players are unlikely to be selected by the provider in the future. The 
constricted right of appeal gives the consumer no recourse even if the 
arbitrator misapplies the law or refuses to admit key evidence of 
wrongdoing. 263  Congress should prohibit mandatory consumer 
arbitration for social networks, particularly when conducted under such 
fundamentally unfair rules. 
 
 
261. We are not the first to castigate consumer arbitration as fundamentally 
unfair to consumers. Indeed, these user agreement arbitration clauses have 
been routinely decried as unfair to consumers. See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, 
supra note 250. 
262. Rustad et al., supra note 51, at 664 (“[C]onsumers are often unaware of 
their procedural rights and obligations until the realities of out-of-court 
arbitration are revealed to them after disputes have arisen.”) (quoting 
from the American Arbitration Association’s Statement of Principles of 
the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee). 
263. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) 
(noting under Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may seek 
revocation of an arbitration agreement “upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” including “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012))) (citations omitted).  
